



The Power of Social Media in China:  

















A Thesis Submitted for  
the Degree of Master of Social Sciences  
in the Department of Political Science,  












“Travel or study, either your body or your soul must be on the way.”   
Inspired by the motto of my life, two years ago, I decided to take a break from my work in 
Beijing as a journalist to attend graduate school. For me, the last two years have been a 
challenging intellectual journey in a foreign country, with many sleepless nights, and 
solitary days in the library. But I have no regrets for having chosen the difficult path, not 
least because I have learned a lot from the bittersweet experience. Gradually but 
surprisingly, I have cultivated an appreciation for the abstract, and have developed a 
contemplative mind. I believe the value of these hard-acquired skills goes far beyond 
academic life.  
 I express great respect and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Zheng Yongnian. Without 
his patient guidance and advice, I would not have been able to even make a modicum of 
scholastic achievements. I am particularly thankful to him for encouraging me to freely 
explore my research topic, for his indefatigable guidance on how to approach academic 
literature and conceptual framework, and for his immensely useful advice that I should 
maintain an independent mind when reading. He taught me to think like a scholar and, most 
importantly, his unparalleled insights into contemporary China studies have deeply 
influenced me during my thesis writing process.   
My sincere thanks also go to all professors and staff at the NUS Political Science 
Department. Without your help and encouragement, I would not have been able to make my 
way from a zero-starter to a Master’s graduate.  
In addition, I am grateful to the invaluable advice and suggestions given by Dr Qi Dongtao, 
Dr. Shan Wei, Mr. Huang Yanjie, Mr. Kwong Kin Ming and many other scholars at the  
NUS East Asia Institute. I am fortunate to have become acquainted with so many 
outstanding scholars whose expertise and research focus are on different aspects of China. 
They have broadened my mind and enlightened my intellectual journey.  
I also want to thank my dear fellow students Chen Chao, Harrison Cheng, Li Xiang, 
Liberty Chee, Walid Jumblatt, Yeung Wing Yan, Yu Xiao, Yuan Jingyan, Zdeni Dejanova, 
Zha Wen, Zheng Renjie and all other graduate students in the Political Science Department: 
thank you for your company during the past two years. Wish all of you a bright future!  
Lastly, I would like to express my special thanks to my family. Two years of separation 
have made me homesick, but 5500 kilometers could never distance my heart from yours. 
Your unconditional love is my steady support. I never fail to remember that every time I 









List of Tables and Figures…………………………………………………………………v 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………….………..1 
1.1 Motive and Significance of the Research                                                           
1.2 Microblogging/Weibo in China                                                                           
1.3 Problem Description and Chapter Outline                                                         
      1.4 Methodology                                                                                                      
 
Chapter 2: Politics on the Internet: From Theories to Chinese Realities ......................21 
2.1 Society-centered School: Civic Engagement on the Internet                               
2.2 State-centered School: State Internet Control                                                     
2.3 The Interactive Mechanism of the government-website-netizen on Weibo        
 
Chapter 3: Internet Development and Control in China................................................41 
3.1 The Internet Industry 
3.2 China's Internet Control  
3.3 Government Involvement 
 
Chapter 4: How Government, Websites and Netizens Interact on Weibo…….………57 
      4.1 The Government: Effective Use or Control?  
      4.2 Websites/Internet Companies: Survival or Profits?  
      4.3 Netizen/Weibo Users: Voice or Noise?  
 
Chapter 5: The Fulfillment of Public Demands on Weibo……………………………..92 
      5.1 Case Selection  
      5.2 Case Analysis  
Yihuang Demolition Incident  
Wenzhou Train Crash  
Free Chen Guangcheng Movement 
Independent Candidates for Local Elections 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….114 
      6.1 Findings 
      6.2 Political Implications 










When social media became one of the most significant shaping forces in the world, China’s 
own social media, in particularly Weibo, has also quietly and decisively changed the ways 
the Chinese were connected. However, different from what it did in Arab Spring in 2011, 
social media in China seems to have contributed little to promoting radical social 
revolutionaries or political changes, despite of the immense freedom of speech created by 
Weibo and the rising trend of social protests in everyday life.  
 
This thesis assesses the impact of Weibo, China’s microblogging, the most popular social 
media featuring real- time information sharing service, on the way state-society relates to 
each other in China. To explore whether the public opinion on Weibo promote China’s 
political/social change, I shall study several cases when netizens use public opinions as a 
means to pursue a civic agenda by eliciting a government response via Weibo. In other 
words, I mainly focus on the questions that why some demands raised from Weibo succeed, 
while others fail? Under what conditions and to what extent, the public demands on Weibo 
can be fulfilled?  
 
To answer the research question, I shall analyze the ways that major forces on Weibo 
interact with each other. Based on existing theoretical literature, especially the theories of 
state-centered school and society-centered school on China’s Internet, I propose my 
theoretical framework——The Interactive Mechanism of the Government-website-netizen 
iv 
 
on Weibo to further explain the sophisticated relations of all parties reflected by China’s 
social media.  
 
By analyzing in detail the concerns and constraints of different forces through both 
institutional analysis and case studies, I argue that there are two variables which play 
critical roles in enforcing government compliance and fulfilling the underlying civil agenda, 
namely, political sensitivity and the scale of the issue. In my analysis based on four 
carefully selected Weibo events hotly discussed on Weibo, I shall account for the different 
attitudes and measures of the government and Weibo operators (websites or Internet 
companies) in response to netizens’ demands.  
 
My empirical findings confirm the hypotheses that under prevailing institutional constraints, 
the two aforementioned critical factors have indeed a critical influence in the government-
website-netizen interactions and are decisive in the outcome of the civic agenda. The 
findings contribute to further understanding of China’s Weibo and complex and delicate 








Lists of Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1   Outreach and Influence Based on the Number of Weibo Followers                        7 
Table 2   The Interactive Effects of Political Sensitivity and Scale of the Issue                  37 
Table 3   The Internet Relevant Public Sectors (national level) in China                            49 
Table 4   Hot topics on Weibo in China in 2010 & 2011                                                      93 
Table 5   Classification of the Cases Selection                                                                     94 
     
Figure 1   The function display of Sina Weibo                                                                       5 
Figure 2   China's Microblogging Users’ Growth 2007-2011                                              10 
Figure 3   The Interactive Mechanism of the Government-website-netizen on Weibo        34 
Figure 4   The Market Values of Listed Chinese Internet Companies in 2011                     44 
Figure 5   The Homepage of Sina.com Displays 15 Licenses Issued by Various   
Government Departments                                                                                    49 
Figure 6   Malan Villagers Sells Potatoes on Weibo                                                             60 
Figure 7   China's Foreign Ministry's Response in Answer to My Request  
                 on Sina Weibo to Help a Chinese Overseas Student                                            62 
Figure 8   A “Monitoring Editor” Job Ad Posted on Sina Weibo                                          79 
Figure 9  New Version of the Interface on Sina Weibo Incorporating  
                More Functions, Ads and Third-party Apps                                                         82 
Figure 10  Sina Weibo Ranking List of Top 10 in May 2012                                               90 
Figure 11  Journalist Deng Fei’s live reports about the Yihuang incident                            96 
Figure 12  The First Two Posts Exposed Wenzhou Train Crash on Sina Weibo                 101 
Figure 13  The Trend of key words “Chen Guangcheng” Discussed  
                  on Sina Weibo from October 2011 to February 2012                                        105 







1.1 Motive and Significance of the Research 
 
The year 2011 witnessed the power of social media, unleashing and contributing to a 
wave of social unrests and political changes in the authoritarian Arab world as well as in 
democratic Western countries. In Tunisia, the spreading warfare and domestic upheavals 
in North Africa were sparked off by the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution; yet, it was Twitter 
and Facebook that are broadly regarded as propellers in diffusing information and 
amplifying its impact. This was the same in the London riots and in the New York 
“Occupying Wall Street” Protest.1
 
 The role that social media play is not simply in 
reshaping the global communication landscape, but in gradually penetrating into all 
spheres of life, from politics to society, from public to individuals, in the West as well as 
in the East.  
Featuring both the information-sharing function and social networking services, social 
media based on Internet technology enables unprecedented freedom for individual users 
to express their opinions and to follow whatever their concerns may be in cyberspace, 
                                                        
1 Jillian C. York, “The Revolutionary Force of Facebook and Twitter”. Nieman Reports 65, no.3 (2001): 49-50. 
  William L. Adams. “Were Twitter or BlackBerrys Used to Fan Flames of London's Riots?”, Time, August 8, 2011. 
accessed October 11, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2087337,00.html; 
  Patrick Gavin, “Wall Street to Occupy Social Media”, NBC NEWYORK, November 3, 2011. accessed December 20, 
2011, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Wall_Street_to__occupy__social_media-133144153.html. 
2 
anytime and anywhere. In terms of China's strict Internet regulations and censorship, 
most Chinese Internet users have no access to overseas social websites because of the 
Great Fire Wall set by the authorities.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not affect local Chinese netizens2
 
, who are already familiar with 
a plethora of social networking and microblogging services, as many homegrown 
Internet companies have successfully launched Chinese versions of social media; Weibo, 
for instance, has attracted hundreds of millions of users within two years, myself 
included, thanks to my previous job as a TV reporter, in 2009, I was invited to try the 
closed beta version of Sina Weibo, a microblogging and social-networking service 
platform operated by Sina, one of China’s dominant Internet company. I began to 
observe the power of this impressive Internet product in China and how it impacted my 
daily work and life. 
I realized that no matter how fast journalists in traditional media worked to update news 
and TV programs, our speed and efficiency seemed to always lag behind that of Weibo. I 
discovered that social media has been gradually penetrating into the work and life of 
many people in China. With more and more Internet users participating in 
microblogging, social media in China is becoming increasingly important. Both 
celebrities and grassroots users have gained opportunities to express their opinions, 
discussing a range of topics from hot public issues to snapshots of their private life 
                                                        
2 Netizen, a combined word of “Internet” and “citizen”, a netizen is a person who becomes part of and participates in 
the Internet society. 
3 
experiences. The enthusiasm of netizen participation on Weibo seems to have surpassed 
all other forms of social media.3
 
 
The convergence of public attention on Weibo has been termed the effect of “Onlooking.” 
Weibo is even highly expected to change everything in life, a slogan, “Attention Is 
Power, Onlooking Changes China” has been widely recognized, from when it was 
proposed.4
 
 More and more Chinese netizens show their optimistic attitude towards 
microblogging, they are willing to see national progresses and social changes brought 
by the new internet platform, while others remains skeptical about how powerful it is.  
For years, I have been intrigued by this question as to whether changes could be brought 
about by the phenomenon of “collective onlooking” on Weibo. In particular, I am 
particularly interested in the following questions: Why do some enthusiastically believe 
that microblogging can bring changes to China, while others simply refuse to accept 
that it can happen? How does microblogging change China? And what will be changed 
next? With these questions in mind, I began my study on microblogging, based on fresh 
information I gathered from Chinese social media and using political science 
methodology.  
 
                                                        
3 Note: 48.9% of Chinese netizens are using Weibo, while the quantities of BBS and blog users decline. Source from:  
The 29th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China. China Internet Network Information Center (CIINC), 
January16, 2012. 
4 Xiao Shu, “Attention is Power, Onlooking Changes China”, Southern Weekend, January13, 2010, accessed 
November 7, 2011, http://www.infzm.com/content/40097;  
  Zhang Yixuan, “The Sunshine empowers microblogging”, People's Daily (Overseas Version), 08 Edition, July 8, 
2011, accessed October 11, 2011, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2011-07/08/content_865950.htm ;  
  KaiFu Lee. Microblogging Changes Everything (Shanghai: Shanghai University of Finance & Economic Press, 
2011).  
4 




Microblogging/Weibo is a social networking and information-sharing service platform 
for Internet users to update and share information, through which netizens can post, 
comment, and forward short texts, images, links, audio and video clips via computers, 
mobile phones, or other instant-messaging tools as long as they have microblogging 
accounts.5
 
 Whether following others or being followed by others, individual users on 
microblogging, compare with other types of media, become important sources in 
information diffusion.   
Twitter, the first and most popular microblogging website worldwide, was created in the 
United States in 2006. So as to be compatible with SMS messaging on mobile phones, 
Twitter messages were limited to 140 characters; despite its limitation, users continue to 
be inspired and enthusiastic about sharing information online. What happened next was 
five years of escalating worldwide popularity, and Twitter now has over 200 million 




                                                        
5 Zhai Zheng, “Microblogs in China: Micro-Changing a Society”, in Social Media and Politics: Online Social 
Networking and Political Communication in Asia. ed. Philip Behnke (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), 
107-118. 
6 Claire Diaz-Ortiz, Twitter for Good: Change the World One Tweet at a Time (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), 
207. 
5 
However, a number of Internet users in China have not been able to access Twitter, as it 
has been blocked by the Chinese authorities since June 2006 for political reasons.7
 
 
Additionally, the information diffused on Twitter is mainly for users in 
English-speaking countries, which undoubtedly causes language barrier for most 
Chinese netizens. For these reasons, Chinese homegrown microblogging websites have 
found opportunities to develop and gain a foothold in China.   
1.2.2 Functions and Features of Microblogging/Weibo 
 
The microblogging service providers in China are not simply copies of Twitter; instead, 
they have improved many of the functions to cater to local Chinese users. The most 
successful imitator is Sina.com, which has improved the comment and forwarding 
functions from Twitter’s 140-character message limit and developed embedded picture 
and video functions in Weibo. (Figure 1)  
Figure 1: The Function Display of Sina Weibo 8
 
 
                                                        
7 Tania Branigan, “China blocks Twitter, Flickr and Hotmail ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary”, Guardian, June 2, 
2009, accessed October 10, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jun/02/twitter-china. 
8 Screenshot of Sina Weibo post, accessed July 8, 2012, http://www.weibo.com/1266321801/yrxi95EgA . 
6 
By improving users’ experience and taking advantage of the lacuna in the local market, 
Sina Corp. has become the leader in China’s microblogging scene. In addition, the rapid 
growth of microblogging in China is inseparable from its three major features: real-time 
sharing, individuality and interactivity. Through microblogging, anyone can share 
anything, anywhere, and at any time.  
 
(1) Real-time sharing: Microblogging greatly accelerates the frequency of information 
updates, and improves the diffusion and dissemination of information from timeliness, 
to real-time sharing. Segmented information released by individuals through computers 
and mobile phones interprets the concepts of “zero distance” and “zero time difference,” 
as the world enters a live broadcasting era, and the threshold of communication greatly 
lowered.9
 
   
(2) Individuality: Microblogging disintegrates the information monopoly held by 
traditional media or authoritative institutions, breaks the “professionalism barrier” and 
eliminates the boundary of identity and class chasm in cyberspace. Individual 
microblogging users are equally empowered to express their own opinions. An 
individual user is able to play multi-roles as promulgator, disseminator, commentator, 
and receiver on microblogging, this also echoes the notion of “We Media” proposed by 
Bowman and Willis in 2003.10
                                                        
9 Zhu Di and Cao Dikun, “The Analysis of Weibo's Influence in Sudden-breaking Incidence”, China Science and 
Technology Information 14 (2011): 150-151. 
  
10 Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis, “We Media: How audiences are shaping the future of news and information”, 
ed. J.D. Lasica (The American Press Institute, 2003), accessed October 11, 2011, 
http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/download/we_media.pdf . 
7 
(3) Interactivity: Microblogging provides a new platform for all users to interact and 
communicate with each other directly and conveniently. One piece of information might 
be echoed by hundreds of thousands of forwarding and comments, which generates 
huge public pressure and effect. A popular saying illustrates the relationship between 
influence and followers on microblogging: “If your followers exceed 100, your 
influence is equal to an internal journal; but when you have over 100,000 followers, 
your influence could reach a metropolitan newspaper; As long as your followers surpass 
10 million, you could be regarded as a TV station.” 11
 
 (Table 1) 





   
 
 
1.2.3 Microblogging/Weibo Background in China 
 
Chinese microblogging service was initiated by Fanfou.com, an independent 
microblogging service website12, which has cloned the design and functions of Twitter 
since May 2007.13
                                                        
11 Yan Juan and Yu Wan, “How Should Officials Deal with the Microblogging Era”, ed. Yuan Bixia, BanYueTan 
(Internal), July 11, 2011, accessed October 28, 2011, 
 The new product attracted many Chinese netizens as soon as it was 
http://sms.banyuetan.org/yqsm/yqyd/110711/47024.shtml. 
12 Note: Compare with portal websites with diverse business, independent microblogging service websites are 
normally operated by professional websites that only focus microblogging content and service business. 
13 Zhang Zhougang, “Fanfou Closed, Where is Twitter's Dinner?”, Southern Metropolis Weekly, July 17, 2009, 
accessed November 9, 2011, http://www.iterasi.net/openviewer.aspx?sqrlitid=na92gi0mh0m6i5uo2jow1q. 
Followers Outreach and Influence 
100+  an internal magazine 
1,000+ a bulletin board 
10,000+ a magazine 
100,000+ a metropolitan newspaper 
1,000,000+ a national newspaper 
10,000,000+ a nationwide TV station 
8 
launched, including cultural celebrities and intellectuals; the number of Fanfou users 
rapidly surged to 100 million within two years. With its phenomenal business success, 
Fanfou seemed to have ploughed into a blue ocean in the white-hot competitive Internet 
market in China.14 Digu, Jiwai, Zuosha, Ailaodao and other Chinese independent 
microblogging websites followed Fanfou’s footsteps, starting and testing the market 
successfully from 2007 to 2009; the first major phase for microblogging in China lasted 
until the middle of 2009.15
 
  
Because of the Urumqi riots in July 2009, almost all the independent microblogging 
websites were shut down overnight by the authorities with the avowed goal of 
organizing the market. However, microblogging led by Fanfou in China had already 
showed the tentative power of real-time communication in the live broadcasts of 
Xinjiang. Hong Qi, a Chinese folk singer, recalled that on the day the riot started, he 
was so anxious to get in touch with his family in Urumqi. Since all the 
telecommunication channels were cut off, Fanfou became the only source of 
information for him to get updated news about what was going on in Xinjiang.16
 
 In 
stark contrast to the grossly understated official reports from the government control 
media, information updated on Fanfou by individuals seemed to be more vivid and 
credible. The function of microblogging was suddenly amplified by Fanfou, which 
inevitably resulted in its subsequent clampdown and closure.  
                                                        
14 Tian Zhiling, “Twitter Era: Everybody is Able to Issue News”, Southern Metropolis Daily, July12, 2009, accessed 
March 3, 2012, http://gcontent.oeeee.com/3/32/3323fe11e9595c09/Blog/198/dabe6f.html 
15 Zhang Zhougang, “Fanfou Closed, Where is Twitter's Dinner?”.  
16 Ibid  
9 
Nevertheless, just one month after all independent microblogging websites were forced 
to close, China's leading news and entertainment web portal, Sina.com, started to launch 
its beta version of microblogging and social-networking service known as Weibo 
(literally translated to mean “Micro+blog” in Chinese) in August 2009. Shortly after, 
other web portals such as Sohu, Tencent, Netease joined the competition and developed 
their own Weibo products, all of which have been rapidly booming and broadly 
recognized by more Chinese netizens since. 
 
The following year, 2010, has been dubbed “inaugural year of Weibo,” as 
microblogging became China's most preferred Internet medium among netizen to 
disclose and disseminate information. Eleven of the top 50 significant public events in 
China were first reported on microblogging, according to the Annual Report on China 
Microblogging 2010 released by Shanghai Jiao Tong University.17 Land acquisition and 
house demolition, official corruption, and improper behavior of the police, were three of 
the most-discussed microblogging topics in 2010.18
 
  
Public discussion on Weibo attracts more and more Internet users to participate, 
providing a new platform for netizens to express themselves and galvanize others. The 
explosive growth of Chinese microblogging users, driven by collective force, appears to 
be unstoppable; the number of Weibo users rose over 208% in the first half of 2011 to 
195 million users, from 63.11 million at the end of 2010, according to a report released 
                                                        
17 Pang Qi, “Micro-blogging Increasing Rapidly in China”, Global Times, December 29,2010, accessed November 4, 
2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/society/2010-12/606969.html. 
18 Internet Real-time Public Opinion Index Annual Report 2010, IRI of Communication University of China, March 
24, 2011. 
10 
by China Internet Network Information Center in July 2011; the latest data by Wang 
Chen, the minister of China's State Internet Information Office, showed that China's 
Weibo users had exceeded 300 million in September 2011.19
 (Note: Adapted from CNNIC data) 
 (Figure 2)  
 
The growing importance of microblogging and its powerful effect caught Chinese 
netizens, the authorities and the market off-guard. Shortly after, the Chinese government 
and microblogging providers implemented a series of measures to deal with the 
unprecedented changes brought about by digital advancement. The Chinese government, 
microblogging operators and Chinese netizens continue to delicately navigate and 




                                                        
19 The 27th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China. China Internet Network Information Center 
(CIINC), January19, 2011; 
  The 28th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China. China Internet Network Information Center (CIINC), 
July 19, 2011; 
  Wang Chen, “Promote Internet Development and Safeguard Internet Security” (Keynote Speech presented at 4th 
China-UK Internet Roundtable), China Daily, September 29, 2011, accessed October 7, 2011, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-09/29/content_13818683.htm.  























Figure 2  China's Microblogging Users’ Growth 2007-2011 
 
Registered Chinese microblogging accounts The number of Chinese netizens 
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1.3 Problem Description and Chapter Outline 
 
The emergence of microblogging/Weibo lowers the threshold of information 
communication, it encourages “the silent majority” to express themselves, millions of 
Internet users in China have gained a new participatory approach to get rid of top-down 
information monopoly by the “party mouthpiece.” On the microblogging platform, 
grassroots produce their own news and analysis, share their own views and comments, 
and choose whomever they are interested to follow.  
 
With more netizens engaged in online discussions, a sense of liberalization has been 
fermenting in cyberspace; public opinion on criticism of the government and the 
backlash against social injustice always creates a rapid resonance among Chinese 
microblogging users, and challenges to the authorities' tolerance are continuously 
bubbling and seem, at times, to reach a bursting point. That is the concern of both the 
government and social-networking platform providers.  
 
The central government is unwilling to allow any discussion to result in possible 
political risk; the "inharmonious" contents disseminating on Weibo are regarded as 
potent threats that may easily provoke popular unrest to social stability and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s authoritarian rule; and there is no doubt that the state frequently 
stretches out its invisible hand to tighten control over Internet information, even as it 
encourages the Internet industry to develop. As the homegrown microblogging service 
12 
providers, few websites dare to make profits on the basis of high political risks, as they 
operate only with the government’s permission.  
 
In fact, commercial portal websites have to voluntarily self-censor so as to please the 
government and obtain more policy support, when they rush to occupy the market and 
attract more users by whatever means possible. Thus, it can be seen that the public 
space on microblogging is still constrained by both governmental and market forces.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the platform has provided netizens an opportunity to 
participate in discussing public issues, the tripartite relationship of government, 
websites and netizens in the social networking era has become even more subtle and 
sophisticated.  
 
In terms of dilemmas and complexities arising from the tripartite effect on Weibo, in 
this research, I chose to adopt an interactive mechanism by which to analyze the 
government, websites and Weibo netizens. Analyzing their strengths and dilemmas 
allows me to present their interactive mechanism in depth. All their concerns and 
interplay can be reflected in exploring the core question as to why some civic issues, 
hotly discussed on Weibo, can raise the public’s attention and even generate active 
government response, while other issues fail to stimulate any response. Further, under 
what conditions and to what extent can public demands be fulfilled via the interaction of 
government, websites and netizen on Weibo?  
 
13 
In this thesis, I posit that the different outcomes arising from the fulfillment of public 
demands on Weibo largely depend on two independent variables: (1) political sensitivity; 
and (2) the scale of the issue. More specifically, I present four empirical cases to explain 
the different outcomes of their interactions on Weibo.   
 
My study focuses on Sina Weibo, the most popular and largest microblogging platform 
in China, operated by China’s dominant portal website, Sina.com. This humongous 
online platform is also the site of the fiercest struggle between censorship and public 
opinions. Sina.com is therefore the best research object for studying the power of China’ 
microblogging; to a large extent, Sina Weibo reflects the Chinese government’s 
information control measures and their response to public demands in the social 
networking era.  
 
Consequently, it also offers the best showcase on the dilemma, strategies and the 
general attitudes and degree of participation by netizens on Weibo, particularly for hot 
social topics with underlying civic agendas. It seems that each party on Weibo has done 
their best to minimize the risks while maximizing the benefits. In the chapters that 
follow, I present my research findings on whether the netizens’ efforts represent a 
zero-sum game or they are able to positively affect the role of Weibo in changing the 
outcomes of public demands. 
 
Existing literature on China's Internet can be largely categorized into two dominant 
14 
camps: state-centered, or society-centered; however, few have contributed specifically 
to the study of China's microblogging. In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical 
framework for studying Weibo, or China's microblogging, by summarizing and 
reviewing previous theories and arguments. Chapter 3, which precedes the core section 
of the thesis, provides information and my initial analysis on the rapid development and 
current status of China's Internet industry and the government’s role in this regard. In 
particular, I shall focus on the various policy mechanisms through which the 
government actively engages with social media such as Weibo while exercising tight 
control over the flow of information, and the action of proscribing boundaries for actors 
such as netizens and Internet companies.  
 
Chapter 4 further substantiates the analysis framework by proposing a tri-party 
interactive mechanism amongst the government, websites and netizens. Each party in 
turn responds to issues related to civic agendas in terms of their own concerns. It is this 
set of responses from government (whether or not to control), Internet companies 
(whether to censor) and netizens’ reaction (concerned or not), all based on the 
characteristics of the issues and the responses of others, that determine the final 
outcome of the interaction.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to examine the hypotheses proposed previously. I selected four cases 
from twenty hotly discussed topics on Weibo in 2009 and 2010, each denoting a unique 
type in terms of variations of both independent variables: political sensitivity and the 
15 
scale of the issues. Based on the study of these four cases, I then explain the root causes 
that lead to different outcomes of public demands on Weibo and assess the validity of 
my hypothesis, which relate the variables to the outcomes of civic engagement on 
Weibo. Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize the key findings of the study, emphasize the 
political implications, and highlight significance of Weibo in promoting government 





Being an emerging social networking platform, microblogging/Weibo seems to have 
caught up only in recent years, thus theoretical study in this field has lagged behind its 
fast development and change. I attempt to combine theories in political science and 
communication with my empirical observation and thinking, aiming to explore how 
both political and market forces exercise influence in the expression and behavior of 
Chinese microblogging/Weibo users, and under what conditions the public demands 
may be fulfilled via the interaction of different forces on microblogging/Weibo.  
 
China’s homegrown microblogging platforms are run by three types of operators: 
independent microblogging websites, commercial portal websites, and traditional media 
(TV stations, newspapers and magazines). For research convenience, this thesis focuses 
primarily on Sina Weibo as the research target, mainly because it is one of the most 
16 
popular microblogging sites in China, and also because the conflicts and interactions 
between various forces and actors on Sina Weibo are the fiercest compared with other 
microblogging sites. By using a mixed method of case study and participation 
observation, I will examine the causal inference between the government, websites and 
netizens in this study, analyze their power and constraints, and further explore their 
interactions and influences to outcomes of public demands.  
 
 
1.4.1 Case Study  
 
As an ideal methodology for in-depth investigation, the case study method provides a 
highly detailed, contextualized analysis of an “an instance in action” combined with 
data, investigators and theories.20 Feagin et al. argue in the book that the case study 
method permits researchers to discover complex sets of decisions and to recount the 
effect of decisions over time, especially political scientists pay more attention to such 
phenomena than other social scientists.21 Flyvbjerg also states that the case study is 
most useful for generating hypotheses, and small N qualitative research is often at the 
forefront of theoretical development.22
 
  
In my research, I introduce empirical cases to facilitate analysis and support my 
                                                        
20 Barry Macdonald and Rob Walker, “Case-study and the Social Philosophy of Educational”, in Beyond the 
Numbers Game: A Reader in Educational Evaluation, ed. David Hamilton (London: MacMillan Education, 1977), 
181-189. 
21 Anthony M. Orum, Joe R. Feagin and Gideon Sjoberg, A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press,1991), 10.  
22 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research”, Qualitative Inquiry 12, no.2 (2006): 
219-245. 
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arguments with regard to the current microblogging development and new 
socio-cultural changes in China. Case selection in small-N research is generally 
regarded as a theory-guided iterative process, and it is important to select cases that 
guarantee sufficient variance in terms of the research question.23
 
 Therefore, I aimed to 
select typical cases that reveal casual mechanisms to explain the research question as 
well as illustrate phenomenon with details.  
Given that microblogging has powerful topic-generating capability, hot public issues or 
extreme cases that attract relatively more attention from netizens will stimulate 
comments and forwarding, yielding valuable information and data for the research. 
However, not all hot topics reflect contradictions between government, market and 
microblogging users. I limited my choices to cases containing political or other sensitive 
contents which easily spur tension between government, websites and Weibo netizens; 
thus, political, social and livelihood topics become major categories in my research. 
 
1.4.2 Most-Similar Systems Design 
 
In consideration of the same political environment and culture that targeting cases have, 
I adopt Most-Similar Systems Design, or MSSD, in this research to analyze the 
outcomes resulted from different types of cases and explore their causal effect at a 
systemic level. As one of most common comparative methods in social sciences, 
                                                        
23 Dirk Leuffen, “Case Selection and Selection Bias in Small-n Research”, in Research Design in Political Science: 
How to Practice what They Preach, ed. Thomas Geschwend & Frank Schimmelfennig (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 145-160. 
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especially in Comparative Politics, MSSD has been comprehensively adopted in 
qualitative research. Przeworski and Teune define MSSD as a comparison method that 
systemic characteristics are conceived of as “controlled for”, whereas intersystemic 
differences are viewed as explanatory variables. 24
 
 
Generally, MSSD starts out with securing variation on the independent variables, then 
explore why outcomes of cases in the similar system turn out to be different.25 The 
reason why I apply this MSSD in my research is that it is helpful to figure out the root 
causes that result in different dependent variables by minimizing differences between 
the systems being compared. 26
 
 
1.4.3 Participant Observation  
 
Participant observation is a considerably important qualitative method in social science 
research. Observing and participating are generally considered the most convenient and 
suitable method to gain close and intimate familiarity with research targets. Participant 
observation can be conducted through direct observation, interviewing, document 
analysis, reflection, analysis and interpretation.27
                                                        
24 Przeworksi & Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York:Wiley,1970), 33-34. 
 As for online research, Kendall argues 
that participant observation enables researchers to develop a better understanding of the 
identity performance of Internet users and its significance for users, and he exhorts that 
25 Carsten Anckar. “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design 
in Comparative Research.”, International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, no 5 (2008): 389-401.  
26 Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice”, Comparative Political Studies 
43(2010): 230-259. 
27 Chris Mann and Fiona Stewart, Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Researching 
Online (London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publication, 2000), 88-89. 
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“all social science research projects ought to include participant observation”.28
 
  
Participant observation normally requires the researcher to allow for sufficient and 
prolonged involvement in the chosen activity with participants. In my case, my 
observation of microblogging/Weibo sites has lasted more than two years. As a 
researcher, I rationally observe netizens’ expressions and reactions via microblogging, 
especially on sudden-breaking incidents and sensitive issues; occasionally, I take on the 
role of participant, joining public discussions and posting comments in an attempt to 
explore attitudes of government and websites in response to public demands. 
 
1.4.4 Data Sources and Alternative Methods 
 
(1) Case study was based on selected Sina Weibo posts and hot topics discussed by 
public figures, key opinion leaders, active journalists and media accounts as well as 
Weibo users at stake; in particular, opinions on politically sensitive incidents and 
figures.  
 
(2) Reliable and valid secondary sources including written material, official working 
papers, annual reports of information technology companies, media reports, and 
analytical statistics from third party service providers were also analyzed to support 
my arguments.  
                                                        
28 Ibid;  
   Lori Kendall, “Recontextualizing “Cyberspace”: Methodological Considerations for On-line Research”, in Doing 




(3) Exclusive interviews were also conducted with active microblogging/Weibo users, 
selected participants including well-known scholars and key opinion leaders and 





















Chapter Two  
Politics on the Internet: From Theories to Chinese Realities 
 
With increasing numbers of people in China using personal computers and mobile 
Internet, by 2010, microblogging promoted by homegrown portal websites has rapidly 
become the most popular Internet-based platform for Chinese netizens; topics relating to 
microblogging have gained a wide following by media and the public. However, in 
academia, the study of microblogging has not kept pace with new trends and 
developments in information technology and the evolving institutional settings in China. 
Most studies in the field still focus on discussing the Internet’s influence and impact on 
the authoritarian state, but there are few studies on the new political changes and 
significance brought by social-networking platforms such as Weibo.  
 
This chapter goes beyond previous academic studies on China’s Internet and aims to 
provide a better understanding of the relationship and interaction among the government, 
websites and netizens on Weibo, and China’s microblogging landscape, further 
exploring the core question: why have some public demands been met by the 
government, while others have not, despite the confluence of interaction among 
government, websites and netizens? What is the root cause that leads to different 
outcomes of public demands on Weibo?  
 
More concretely, the discussions in this chapter cover three areas: the first section 
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discusses different views about civic engagement on the Internet from the 
society-centered perspective; the second section focuses on state Internet control in the 
state-centered perspective; and the third part presents the interactive mechanism of the 
government-website-netizen on Weibo to reflect the mutual influence and interplay 
among the three actors; and in the final section, I propose the hypotheses used in this 
study.  
 
Existing views on the role of the Internet can be largely grouped into two opposing 
camps: society-centered and state-centered. Society-centered theorists29
 
 often take the 
netizens stance, arguing that the Internet empowers ordinary individuals, as it breaks the 
boundaries of countries and the monopoly of information, creating a public sphere in 
cyberspace for those at the grassroots level to gain equal access to information and to be 
able to express their opinions, thus enabling more people to participate in online 
discussions of public affairs, which promotes political openness, transparency and 
accountability to a certain extent.  
In contrast to the bottom-up perspective, state-centered theorists30
                                                        
29 Aaron Smith et al., The Internet and Civic Engagement; Robert Putman, Making Democracy Work; Rachel Gibson 
et al., “Online Participation in the UK” ; Antoinette Pole, Blogging the Political; Sylvester & McGlynn, “The Digital 
Divide, Political Participation and Place”; Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics; Tai Zixue, The Internet in China; 
Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact”;Yang Guobin, The Power of the Internet in 
China: Citizen Activism Online. 
 are more likely to 
adopt a top-down approach to analyze the relationship between the state and the Internet. 
They stress that the Internet, as a neutral communication vehicle, can also be used to 
30 Zheng Yongnian, Technological Empowerment; Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays; 
Anthony Giddens, “The Nation-State and Violence”; Wu Guoguang, “In the Name of Good Governance”; Evgeny 
Morozov, “Whither Internet Control?”;Nina Hachigian, The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States.  
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consolidate the ruling party’s political power; although they do not deny that public 
opinion on the Internet may present some challenges to the authorities, nevertheless 
they question whether, and if, information technology is able to promote democracy or 
if the Internet could change the state, especially in countries where censorship by the 
central authority prevails.   
 
 
2.1 Society-centered School: Civic Engagement on the Internet  
 
Scholars on politics of the new media are generally divided on the role of the Internet in 
civic participation. The more optimistic scholars generally hold that the information 
technology-based new media promotes citizen participation in public issues. Compared 
with traditional media, the Internet not only lowers the threshold and cost of 
interpersonal communications, it also attracts more people to become involved in the 
public life and in policy-making. As a result, activities and opinions are no longer 
limited to the real world, and citizens have gained unprecedented freedom in cyberspace, 
since they can now engage in all forms of online participation without incurring the 
hefty costs of organizing gatherings, protests and mess events in the real world. 
Hundreds of thousands of netizens constitute the entities of online engagement or 
political participation in cyberspace. The powerful expression and voice online is able 
to play an influential role in changing the technological and market landscape, and has 
increasingly become the basic fabric of everyday civic life.  
24 
 
A report by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project shows that 
“those who use blogs and social networking sites as an outlet for civic engagement are 
far more active in traditional realms of political and nonpolitical participation than are 
other Internet users. In addition, it is observed that they (the netizens) are more active 
than those who do not use the Internet at all,” and there are hints that long-standing 
patterns based on socioeconomic status are expected to be altered by the forms of civic 
engagement anchored in blogs and social networking sites.31
 
  
Admittedly, the Internet has empowered individuals with political resources and 
opportunities to participate in political process in ways that were previously not possible. 
Derived from Putnam’s concept of civic engagement, netizen engagement in my thesis 
refers to the active participation of citizens in public affairs through microblogging.32 
Many scholarly works have been concerned with the relationship between civic 
engagement and the Internet in the past two decades. Gibson et al. argues that the 
Internet expands the numbers of the politically active, specifically in terms of reaching 




In the same vein, Antoinette Pole contends that greater Internet penetration provides 
                                                        
31 Aaron Smith et al., The Internet and Civic Engagement, Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project, 
September 3, 2009. 
32 Robert D. Putman, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), 87-91.  
33 Rachel K. Gibson, Wainer Lusoli and Stephen Ward, “Online Participation in the UK: Testing a ‘Contextualized’ 
Model of Internet Effects”, Policy Studies Association 7, no.4 (2005): 561-583. 
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more individuals with opportunities to influence politics, to engage in political 
communication, and to participate in civic lives.34 Sylvester and McGlynn apply three 
government contact models to demonstrate that those who use the Internet more 
frequently in their homes are more likely to contact the government.35 The Internet has 
not only played a significant role in reducing political inequality by facilitating the flow 
of information, but also provides a public space for citizens to influence political agenda 
through collective actions in turn, as Robert Dahl points out information technology 
increases universal accessibility for citizens, allowing them to participate in the political 
agenda process, as well as promotes and impels the transparency of the government.36
 
 
The Internet makes it easier for the public to monitor the behavior and actions of 
government officials; with netizen participation, corruption and improper activity can be 
more effectively exposed and contained. 
China scholars have also championed the Internet’s positive role in promoting civic 
engagement. In his book, The Internet in China, Tai analyzes the interplay between civil 
society and the Internet in the Chinese context, and he argues that the Internet has been 
widely used by Chinese netizens to disseminate information, organize online petitions 
and offline protests, extract varying degrees of responsiveness and accountability from 
the authorities, and affect government decision-making on important social, political 
                                                        
34 Antoinette Pole, Blogging the Political: Politics and Participation in a Networked Society (New York & London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
35 Dari E. Sylvester and Adam J. McGlynn, “The Digital Divide, Political Participation and Place”, Social Science 
Computer Review 28 (2010): 64-74. 
36 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989);  
  Zheng Yongnian, Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State and Society in China (CA: Stanford University 





Generally, the Internet has been regarded “a barometer” for politicians and 
policymakers to gauge public opinion, as it has created an opportunity for Chinese 
netizens to express themselves in various ways previously impossible for the public.38 
But the Internet’s impact on civic engagement is not always welcomed by the state, 
which views the Internet’s ability to galvanize and democratize a participating civil 
society as insurmountable challenges and threatens to the authoritarian regime, 
questioning the very basis of the party-state rule. By analyzing the complex interaction 
of five parties—state, corporate, activists, transnational actors and culture—Yang 
Guobin argues in his monograph that the Internet plays a significant role in shaping 
political contention in China and posits that increasing “citizen activism online” would 
finally facilitate the process of democratization.39
 
 
Compared with the optimistic school, scholars with a more pessimistic outlook on the 
Internet remain cautious about the causal relationship between the proliferation of the 
Internet and successful civic engagement, as they judge the role of the Internet in 
society as generally undermining, rather than enhancing, social connectedness. Building 
on this basic observation, they raise serious doubts on the optimist’s claim that the 
Internet is able to change social and political inequalities. Nie and Erbring provide a key 
                                                        
37 Tai Zixue, The Internet in China (New York & London: Routledge, 2006), 261-262.  
38 Tai Zixue, The Internet in China, 101-104; 
   Xiao Qiang, “The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact”, in Changing Media, Changing China, 
ed. Susan L. Shirk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
39 Yang Guobin, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009) 
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finding in a Stanford report that “the more hours people use the Internet, the less time 
they spend with real human beings,” which reduces face-to-face interactions with 
families and friends, thereby undermining social life. 
 
This finding has supported the early study that excessive Internet usage may lead to 
depression and even feelings of alienation and isolation.40 The digital divide is believed 
to be another element that widens the gap between the information rich and poor, the 
activists and the disengaged, and reinforcing and exacerbating existing disparities.41 
Norris strongly questions whether the Internet will actually strengthen the voice of the 
voiceless, and she tends to believe that in developed countries, the Internet has already 
shown its propensity to output new forms of cultural imperialism.42 Davis likewise 
argues that the widening gap between the politically active and the inactive made by the 
Internet will erect a digital barrier to those who are uninterested and uninvolved in 
participation as well as offer greater advantages to political elites.43
 
  
However, it is possible that this logic could work differently under the Chinese political 
                                                        
40 Norman H. Nie & Lutz Erbring, Internet and Society (SIQSS: Stanford University, February 17, 2000). Accessed 
November 11, 2011, 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/alan/webuse/handouts/Nie%20and%20Erbring-Internet%20and%20Society%20a%20
Preliminary%20Report.pdf  
John B. Horrigan, “Portraits of American Internet Use: Findings from the Pew Internet and American Life Project”, 
in Computers, phones, and the Internet: Domesticating Information Technology. ed. Robert E. Kraut et al. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Robert Kraut et al., “Internet Paradox: A Social Technology That Reduces Social Involvement and Psychological 
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Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & 
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41 Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 26-28. 
42 Pippa Norris, “The Worldwide Digital Divide: Information Poverty, the Internet and Development” (Paper for the 
Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association of the UK, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
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43 Richard Davis, The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 183-184. 
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system. For example, in his seminal studies on informational technology in China, 
Zheng Yongnian argues that in authoritarian China, the Internet could enable citizen 
participation in the discussion of public issues online, whereas the possibility of a 





2.2 State-centered School: State Internet Control  
 
As early as decades ago, Marxists emphasized the importance of ideology control in 
enhancing state power; the ideological measures are relatively soft, compared with the 
more violent function of repressive apparatus. On the Marxist theory of state, Louis 
Althusser, a French Marxist philosopher, proposes a concept of “ideological state 
apparatuses” to stress the role of the state in shaping ideology through religion, family, 
the legal and political system, trade union, communications and culture, which is 
different from the “repressive state apparatuses” (the government, the administration, 
the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, etc.). He even points out that, “No class can 
hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony 
over and in the state ideological apparatuses”.45
 
  
Giddens argues in the same vein; in Nation-State and Violence, he emphasizes that the 
                                                        
44 Zheng Yongnian, Technological Empowerment, 103-104.  
45 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2001), 96-98. 
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generation of state power involves “the regularized gathering, storage, and control of 
information applied to administrative ends”.46
 
 Marxists pointed to the inherent nature 
of the state, but they never anticipated that the conventional monopoly of information 
would be gradually corroded by digital power, which has overtly and continuously 
challenged the state’s authority in the information age.  
The Internet has empowered netizens with unprecedented possibilities to express 
themselves and participate in public debates, becoming the most potent incubator of 
liberation and democracy. This has seriously challenged governments’ credibility and 
authority, and has increased public awareness and demands for transparency, causing 
considerable political concern to state and national governments. However, political 
scientists suggest that this is not all negative; Zheng Yongnian points out that the “voice” 
presented by Internet users do not always “aim to undermine or overthrow the state” but 
instead helps the state to collect public opinions as well as improve their legitimacy.47
 
  
More and more governments worldwide have been made aware of the importance of 
embracing the Internet to improve their effective governance; authoritarian regimes 
have also attempted to explore effective ways to further consolidate their ruling position 
with the help of the Internet. But, unlike democracies, which proactively promote 
Internet freedom, authoritarian states maintain a somewhat cautious and negative 
attitude toward the Internet, as its ability to spread information far and wide seems 
                                                        
46 Anthony Giddens, “The Nation-State and Violence” in vol.2 of A Contemporary Critique of History Materialism 
(Berkeley & L.A.: University of California Press, 1987), 177-178.  
47 Zheng Yongnian, Technological Empowerment, 165-166.  
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contrary to the state monopoly of communication.48
 
  
Generally, authoritarian states tend to adopt two dominant strategies to enforce Internet 
control: one is to control the URL and IP addresses of websites through technological 
means, while the other is to tighten surveillance on illegal or unhealthy contents and 
information on the Internet through legislative means. Morozov summarizes these two 
dimensions in government information policy as a technological dimension and a 
sociopolitical dimension. The technological control is the direct means that blocks the 
websites by filtering sensitive contents automatically via a technical censorship system, 
while sociopolitical control is the use of indirect means to enforce policies, regarding 
Internet-based blogging platforms as traditional media organs and requiring them to 
screen certain keywords before or after the information being published.49
 
 In practice, 
most authoritarian governments tend to exercise a combination of both means to harness 
the destabilizing potential of Internet information.  
However, things are not always black or white in any given set of policy options, just as 
there are more alternatives for authoritarian states than only “embrace” or “restrict” in a 
response to rapid changes brought about by the Internet. Analyzing six single-party 
states in East Asia, Hachigian categorizes four types of restriction on Internet access and 
online political content and usage as severe, significant, moderate, or negligible, which 
also reflect deep ambivalence on the part of the authoritarian regimes toward the 
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 On the one hand, they are reluctant to give away the economic growth 
brought by the Internet, but are even more unwilling to see any negative impact from 
the Internet that could result in political risks. Therefore, the authorities have had to 
balance between whether, how, and to what extent they should control Internet 
information.  
With the dual goals of maximizing economic gains and enhancing their legitimacy, most 
governments in authoritarian states give tacit consent to some restricted Internet 
freedom in exchange for economic growth instead of entirely rejecting the information 
technology. People in authoritarian states are thus permitted limited access to filtered 
information while enjoying a certain degree of freedom to discuss the country’s 
problems and social injustices through websites and social networking services. At the 
same time, governments attach importance to online public opinion supervision for fear 
that any detrimental element may undermine the political security of the regimes. The 
sophistication has been defined by Mackinnon as “networked authoritarianism,” which 
can be interpreted as a form of Internet control that emphasizes manipulation over 
censorship.  
  
These new trends and transformations largely result from the interaction between the 
state and social forces. As a neutral tool, the Internet empowers both the government 
and the public netizen. On the surface, the governments make certain concessions to the 
                                                        
50 Nina Hachigian, “The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States”, The Washington Quarterly 25, no.3 
(2002): 41-58. 
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public by loosening control on selected domains, but in fact they are merely creating an 
illusion of freedom so as to consolidate ruling position in a more calculated manner.  
 
This sometimes illusory Internet freedom in authoritarian states creates some pressure 
for liberalization and even democratization as netizens feel empowered to participate in 
political discussions, in reality, the grassroots netizens’ agenda are usually scattered and 
disunited and hardly capable posing as a challenge to the ruling power. Rather than 
weakening the regime, the signals of public discontent on less-than-political sensitive 
issues may effectively move governments to take prompt actions in redressing the 
misdeeds of its agents. Thus, the regime can use the Internet not only to extend its 
control but also to enhance its legitimacy in many ways.51 On the other hand, the sheer 
fact that the attentions and attitudes of millions could be found on huge online platforms 
means that they are a force to be recognized by the government and harnesses by the 
corporate sector. Thus, despite limited ability to change the regime’s physical power in a 
sudden or radical way, the Internet is still able to greatly affect the persuasive power of 
the regime based on information control or on the promise of material benefits.52
 
  
As for China, where there are multiple layers of government and a variety of public 
issues, the game between the government and the netizens turns out to be even more 
sophisticated when it comes to social networking, as evidenced by a shift in the forces 
that increase uncertainties and widen struggles, which undoubtedly impact the original 
                                                        
51 Rebecca MacKinnon, China's “Networked Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (2011): 32-46.  
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2.3 The Interactive Mechanism of the Government-website-netizen on 
Weibo 
 
Scholars from the society-centered school focus more on citizen participation on the 
Internet and emphasize their push in changing society, while the state-centered school 
highlights the state’s force and strategy in controlling the Internet. Both perspectives are 
insufficient to explain the complex state-society relationship in microblogging era, as an 
increasingly important actor——Internet companies, the operators of websites that 
sandwich between the government and Internet users, are always overlooked. In fact, 
how these microblogging service providers behave has already gone far beyond 
business and profits, their decisions are possible to influence the outcomes of 
interactions and struggles between the government and netizens via microblogging 
websites. I therefore propose that the theoretical framework in my study on China’s 
Weibo be used to supplement existing body of theoretical literature.  
 
As the diagram below shows (Figure 3), checks and balances of the three 
actors—government, websites and netizens—can be reflected via microblogging/Weibo, 
as they struggle and conflict with and, at the same time, mutually influence each other. 
Internet companies (websites) operate microblogging platforms, providing information 
and entertainment to their users, and creating new channels for the government to 
understand public opinion. However, Internet companies have to comply with 
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governmental laws and administrative orders to contain and control information, 
especially political censorship; at the same time, they also make the effort to attract 
more netizens and increase profit.  
 
Through this social networking platform, Internet companies aim to expand their 
business and market share; netizens gain additional channels on which to vent 
grievances and share their opinions, while the government seems more likely to make 
good use of the technology to enhance their social control and governance. Using social 
media, all three forces attempt to maximize their benefits and minimize their risks in 
this sophisticated game.  
 
Figure 3: The Interactive Mechanism of the Government-website-netizen on Weibo 
 
The Government  
 
                      Control                 Public opinion    
                          
 
Internet companies   Operation   Microblogging   
         (Websites)       Censorship     (Weibo) 
 
 
Traffic & Profit               Info & Entertainment 
 
                 Netizens  
 
Regardless whether mutual influence or restriction, the interaction of the three 
actors—government, Internet companies and netizens—depends mainly on the 
significance or extent of the impact of the hot topics disseminated on Weibo. Among the 
hot topics is one that occupies the hearts and minds of netizens concerned about pushing 
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for a definitive redress or making demands on the government for action ranging from a 
simple affirmative, economic compensation; policy review, legal action, political or 
other structural reforms. I define such hot topics on Weibo as civic agenda, and limit this 
study to civic objectives and agendas hotly discussed on Weibo.  
  
Thus defined, we can further classify the different types and natures of civic agenda and 
analyze their impact in terms of interaction among government-website-netizen on the 
Chinese microblogging scene which, in turn, determines the outcome of public demands. 
I propose the variables: the degree of political sensitivity and scale of the issue as two 
dimensions to examine the fulfillment of public demands about the civic agenda on 
Weibo.  
 
Political sensitivity in this research specially means the degree of sensitivity that the 
political or government-related agenda hotly discussed by netizens on Weibo. It is 
generally assumed those topics that directly involve the core ideological tenets and 
constitutional institutions of the current political regime. The degree of the sensitivity 
can be largely divided into three levels, the first level is “high sensitive agenda” that 
refers to the Weibo posts contains contents or implications that openly challenge the 
fundamental political system, attempt to topple the ruling party, seek a reinterpretation 
of political taboos, such as the Tiananmen Square Protest of 1989, Tibetan or Uyghur 
ethnic split, human rights issues, dissidents and etc.; “low sensitive agenda” comes next, 
it mainly covers hot topics that have the possibility of spurring mass movements, 
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speculate ongoing power struggles in the top leadership, or targeting to criticize the 
government or officials in specific issues; the third level, “non-sensitive agenda” that 
refers to contents/posts on Weibo have no correlation with any political or public affairs.  
 
Although there have been no explicit nor unified criteria about the degree of political 
sensitivity in China, one important indicator to measure political sensitivity may be the 
enforcement of censorship targeting certain issues. As a sufficient and critical condition, 
political sensitivity in fact plays a decisive role in influencing governmental 
intervention, which directly results in the Internet companies taking it upon themselves 
to enforce self-censorship; therefore whether the issue discussed on Weibo is political 
sensitive or not, depends on how the three parties—government, websites and 
netizens—interact so as to affect the fulfillment of public demands.  
 
The Scale of the issue is defined here as the “number” of people whose interests are 
directly at stake (although clearly all such incidents indirectly concern public interests). 
By this standard, we can classify civic agenda into individual or collective cases. As a 
necessary variable, it concerns how much public attention and the strength of public 
opinion towards the issue, and the level of government (central or local) involved in the 
issue and their subsequent responses. In addition to the interaction of 
government-website-netizen on Weibo as presented previously, I selected relevant cases 
that were hotly discussed by netizens on Weibo, analyzed their different causes and will 
explain how this interactive mechanism on Weibo is affected by both political sensitivity 
37 
and the scale of the issue(s), and how these factors interact to determine the final 
outcomes of the public demands.  
 
In terms of the variations of independent variables, the interactive effects of the public 
demands can be specifically generated into a two by two matrix on the basis of the two 
charts above (Table 2). For research convenience, I broadly classified the scale of the 
issues on Weibo into two categories: individual-relevant issue and collective-relevant, 
according to the number of people involved; on the degree of political sensitivity, I 
introduced “high” and “low” to differentiate the degree of interest in topics hotly 
discussed by the public on Weibo. 
 
Table 2 The Interactive Effects of Political Sensitivity and the Scale of the Issue 
 Individual-relevant Issue Collective-relevant Issue 
Low political 
sensitive topics 
Fulfillment Partial fulfillment 
High political 
sensitive topics 
Partial fulfillment No fulfillment 
 
To explore the extent of fulfillment, I adopted three benchmarks—fulfillment, partial 
fulfillment and no fulfillment—based on the final outcomes of the cases I selected. 
“Fulfillment” suggests that all demands requested by the people at stake have been met 
after being highlighted on Weibo; “partial fulfillment” indicates that the government 
only responded to a portion of the requirements, and “no fulfillment” means that public 
had failed to achieve their demands.  Based on the Table 2, I argue that political 
sensitivity of Weibo posts is negatively related to the fulfillment of the public demands; 
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the scale of the issue discussed on Weibo is negatively related to fulfillment of the 
public demands public demands; and the Interaction of political sensitivity and scale of 
the issue on Weibo predict different types of fulfillment of the public demands public 
demands.  
 
As a sufficient condition that critically determines the government response and 
websites measures, political sensitivity of topics discussed on Weibo plays a dominant 
role in affecting the outcomes of public demands. Highly politically sensitive issues will 
inevitably raise the possibility of government interference for political concern. 
Consequently, a high degree of political sensitivity increases the government’s difficulty 
in fulfilling public demands. By contrast, less politically sensitive topics hotly discussed 
on Weibo tend to be isolated events that entail less political costs even if fully addressed.  
  
The scale of the issue also has a key influence on the extent of government fulfillment. 
Individual relevant issues are naturally on a smaller scale than collective-relevant issues 
and thus tend to be less influential. But the correlation between scale and fulfillment 
tends to be ambivalent. While more significant or influential issues that involve 
collective claims are easy to result in more government attention, they do not 
necessarily elicit the most effective or positive response from both the government and 
websites, since the costs of policy adjustment must be higher. Furthermore, since the 
stake of each party in collectively relevant issues involved is most likely smaller than 
individual-relevant cases, the problem of free riders may arise. Moreover, the effects of 
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the scale are complicated by the attitudes of the Internet companies, since they would 
have the incentive to favor and promote issues of larger scale that could attract attention 
from more netizens to their platforms. 
 
Given all these analysis, four scenarios can be drawn from the interaction of political 
sensitivity and the scale of the issue.  
 
Scenario 1: Individual-relevant issue with low political sensitivity is likely to increase 
the possibility of fulfillment of the public demands via the interaction of 
government-website-netizen on Weibo. 
  
Scenario 2: Collective-relevant issue with low political sensitivity is likely to lead to 
public demands being partially fulfilled via the interaction of 
government-website-netizen on Weibo. 
  
Scenario 3: Individual-relevant issue with high political sensitivity is likely to result in 
partial fulfillment of public demands via the interaction of government-website-netizen 
on Weibo. 
 
Scenario 4: Collective-relevant issue with high political sensitivity possibly leads to the 
result of no fulfillment of public demands via the interaction of 
government-website-netizen on Weibo. 
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It is also necessary to note that these two factors could interact to bring about different 
outcomes in their different combinations. When the scale of an issue is multiple highly 
political sensitive, a multiplier effect is possible to result. This fatal combination may 
mean a challenge to the regime and the fulfillment of the demands may be extremely 
costly, politically. On the contrary, when individual-relevant issues on Weibo happen to 
be low-political sensitive, there will be minimal political costs and the odds that the 
demands of the individual will be fulfilled will then increase.  
 
For the other two categories, when the dominant factor of political sensitiveness 
interacts with the ambivalent factor of scale, the outcome will be more ambivalent and 
case-specific. In other words, the policy response from the government tends to rest on 
a weighing of costs and benefits specific to the issues and actors involved. I shall 










Chapter Three  
Internet Development and Control in China 
 
 
3.1 The Internet Industry  
 
Many studies on China’s Internet industry generally concentrate on its “liberal 
effects” on Chinese society or governmental censorship; however, the role of Internet 
companies is often not studied. In fact, as an indispensable pole of tripartite relations of 
the government-website-netizen, Chinese Internet firms have bridged top and bottom by 
offering products and services that exert considerable influence or are influenced by the 
politics and society. Thanks to paradoxical policies, the state’s regulation and control are 
pervasive, which nevertheless does not seem to impact the thriving Internet business.  
 
Three dominant ideological schools in political economy have contributed the basis on 
which to analyze the relations of state and market. In an ideal market, liberal economists 
believe, the government is responsible for creating the business environment, whereas 
enterprises in free market competition make products that create wealth. They stress that 
the market should be free from political interference, while economic nationalists with 




Economists in the nationalistic perspective advocate the primacy of politics over 
economics, or at least, that political factors play the dominant role in economic 
development. Marxists, a third dominant school, claim that politics is determined by 




Although the three approaches have had profound influence in scholarship, it seems 
none can fully explain the sophisticated China model. Martin Jacques opposes the idea 
of indiscriminately applying western logic and theories in analyzing the relations of the 
party-state and market in China. He argues that the China’s hyper market is always 
combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state, which is based on a very old 
tradition of statecraft that dates back thousands of years.54
 
  
Regardless whether state-owned enterprises, private-owned or foreign-owned,  all 
enterprises that operate in China are marked with distinctive Chinese characteristics in 
that their business are inextricably linked with the government, which play 
simultaneous multi-roles as participant, supervisor and rule-setter. The authority of the 
state flows into every corner of the market, although the government has carried out 
market economy strategy for decades. The market, in the eyes of the liberal, is believed 
to be shaped or even distorted by state power. Chinese historian Zhu Xueqin uses a 
                                                        
53 Robert Gilpin, “Three ideologies of Political Economy”, in The Political Economy of International Relations 
(Princeton University Press,1987), 25-64. 
54 Martin Jacques, How China Will Change the Way We Think: The Case of the State (Washington DC: Transatlantic 
Academy), February 2011, accessed March 17, 2012, 
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metaphor to interpret it as the “visible foot” (administrative power) stepping on the 
“invisible hand” (the market).55
 
 In other words, the Chinese hyperactive market and 
booming business are, in reality, built and propelled by the state.  
Compared to other conventional media that originated from a centralized planned 
economy, the Chinese Internet as an emerging high-tech sector has gained a less 
controlled market environment. In the last 20 years, the central government has 
intentionally issued a series of explicit policies for the purpose of promoting the 
development of the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, as it 
regards the Internet industry as an opportunity to catch up with Western developed 
countries, or at least to stay undefeated in the global information warfare.  
 
In the late 1990s, most rising star Internet firms were state-driven in the context of 
national informationization strategy. As phenomenal state investments were poured into 
the building of infrastructure and other applications, the whole industry grew by leaps 
and bounds during the past decade.56 Meanwhile, tens of thousands of private Internet 
firms have sprung up all over the country, and the number of websites registered in 
China escalated to 1.83 million by the middle of 2011.57
 
  
According to an estimated report in May 2011, the combined market capitalization of 
                                                        
55 Zhu Xueqin, “1998: Zi You Zhu Yi Xue Li De Yan Shuo (Liberal Discourse in China)”, China Book Business 
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the top ten listed Chinese Internet-related firms in Nasdaq exceeds $150 billion; their 
businesses include search engine, instant messaging, online games, e-commerce, and 
social networking.58
 
 (Figure 4) 




(Note: Adapted from the Economist) 
 
The rapid growth of Chinese Internet giants is inseparable from the government’s 
encouragement and support in the name of promoting national Internet business but, 
interestingly, these overseas-listed firms are mostly backed by foreign venture capital, 
although their founders are all Chinese homegrown entrepreneurs. Take the top three 
firms, Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba, as examples, DFJ ePlanet Ventures—an American 
venture capital company—owns more than 25% shares of Baidu. MIH—a South 
African multimedia company owned by Naspers—holds 35% of Tencent. Likewise, 
                                                        




both George Soros—the well-known U.S. investor—and Yahoo are two major 
shareholders of Alibaba Group. While these foreign capital-financed firms introduced 
robust systems of modern corporate governance and followed international business 
norms from the beginning, they are not completely free from state power either. On the 
contrary, the larger they grow, the greater the likelihood that they will attract the 
government’s attention, and the closer their interactions with those at the higher levels 
of government. Often, they simply toe the government propaganda line and practice 
self-censorship, as long as they are allowed to make profit in the competitive market.  
 
However, a fact easy to ignore is that Chinese Internet firms are sometimes also willing 
to take the initiative to please the government, as they pragmatically choose to 
cooperate with the government even before the government gives instructions, because 
they understand the rule of the game that however large they may become, they have to 
depend on state patronage in many ways. Closer cooperation with the government, in 
particular, the central government, means the lower political risks they will have to take; 
thus, it is a “win-win” situation instead of a zero-sum game, since a little compromise 
on freedom in the virtual space could mean big money in the real world of business.     
 
Since domestic Internet giants are concurrently major contributors of local and central 
state coffers to the tune of billions of dollars every year, the governments at all levels 
are naturally prepared to offer something in return. They focus more on those 
disobedient foreign Internet companies, exert explicit policies or take blocking or 
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restricting measures through technological barriers, which objectively protect domestic 
firms from fierce foreign competition. For example, as soon as Google, the world 
largest search engine, threatened to exit the mainland China market in early 2010 
because of strict censorship, Baidu, the most powerful competitor to Google in China, 
became the major beneficiary, with its stock price rising 14%; after the government 
closed the small and independent microblogging websites and blocked access to 
overseas social networking sites, Sina.com, one of the largest Chinese web portals, 
obtained permission from the authorities to launch its own Weibo product, and has 
rapidly grown to become the largest microblogging service provider in China.  
 
Therefore, it is easy to see what is at stake and why these Chinese Internet giants seem 
ambivalent towards information freedom and government intervention in the virtual 
world. Unlike their international counterparts, Google, YouTube and Facebook, which 
frequently champion the values of a free flow of information and open access for all, the 
Chinese Internet giants seem to act more like the purely interest-driven capitalist 
enterprises in the pre-information age.    
 
Many Chinese Internet firms insist on the primacy of business profit, but their business 
strategies are not always consistent; instead, they often swing between the government 
and their customers or netizens. So far, Chinese Internet users number close to 500 
million; although the number of Internet users does not create profit directly, they are 
indeed the source of profits. Thus, in part, Internet firms sustain their businesses by 
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increasing their customer base through a combination of technology and business 
products.  
 
The biggest challenge for Chinese firms is how to satisfy the government without 
offending their users, but it is usually difficult to meet the demands of both parties. 
Tightening the rules on editorial freedom could easily result in a loss of active and 
influential users who could easily turn to other websites that do not restrict their online 
behavior and activities; therefore, how much, or to what extent, the Internet users resist 
will often influence the Internet firms’ decision.60
 
 As market entities, the Internet 
enterprises have to seek a balance between the government and Internet users, or face ill 
consequences. If the users switch to other service providers, a traffic slowdown could 
result, leading to a loss in profits and market capitalization for the Internet firms. In fact, 
whenever the government announces its intention to tighten Internet control and 
censorship, the share price of affected listed companies rapidly dive as their stock 
values plummet. Such a consequence obviously goes against the ultimate business goals, 
that of making profit by attracting and retaining as many users as possible. 
Besides making profit, these Internet service and content providers play a significant 
role in balancing the power of government vis-à-vis internet users, especially when both 
parties challenge the bottom line of each other, with the government seeking a 
“harmonious” Internet environment with less unfavorable information for the regime, 
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whereas netizens demand freedom of speech and expression. Often, the parties’ 
concerns can become transformed to business momentum as a result of mutual 
influence and compromise. 
 
 
3.2 China’s Internet Control  
 
The first decade of this century has witnessed explosive Internet development in China. 
In the middle of 2008, China replaced the U.S. as the world’s largest Internet market, 
with more than 253 million netizens, and was reported to have reached over 500 million 
in 2011.61
  
 So as to ensure that the Internet effect works only to stimulate economic 
development in China instead of undermining the power and authority of the regime, 
the central authority has established a regulatory mechanism of legislative governance 
and political censorship at all levels and in different sectors.  
Over the years, more than ten government ministries and party organs have been 
involved in Internet governance in China, with different departments and offices being 
tasked with supervising and issuing of licenses, approval of business operations, 
management, etc. In other words, an Internet company has to go through all kinds of 
hurdles in China. (Figure 5)   
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The Joint Management is one of various government offices that have extended the 
government’s regulatory arm to control Internet firms. Nevertheless, the overlap and 
absence of management among government ministries at times results in power 
struggles and turf grabbing, which have curtailed the state’s ability to effectively govern 
the Internet.63 (Table 3) In addition, lack of communication among bureaus can also 
hamper the state control. Hu Yong, China's leading expert on new media, criticizes such 
low-efficient management costs as wasting a great deal of time and manpower resources, 
which have as also resulted in rent-seeking and shady deals.64
TABLE 3: The Internet Relevant Public Sectors (national level) in China
  
65
The Party and State Sectors 
 
Management Areas  
Standing Committee of National 
People’s Congress 
Draft and issue Internet related laws and 
regulations 
The State Council  Issue regulative rules  
Publicity Department of the 
Central Committee of the CPC 
Top propaganda guidance from the Party 
State Internet Information Office 
(SIIO) 
Direct, coordinate and supervise online 
content management and handle 
administrative approval of businesses related 
to online news reporting 
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Ministry of Public Security 
 
Filtering and monitoring the internet contents, 
safeguarding the cyber security, cracking 
down illegal and criminal activities on 
Internet 
Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) 
regulation and development of the postal 
service, Internet, wireless, software industry, 
broadcasting, communications, value-added 
communications, production of electronic and 
information goods 
Ministry of Culture Internet products, including online game, 
audio and video, arts, and performances, issue 
internet cultural operation permission 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
promoting next generation information 
technological development, including 
integration of telecom, radio and TV, and 
Internet networks, cloud computing, internet 
of things, etc. 
Ministry of Commerce  e-business and internet retailers 
Ministry of Health  Internet information on health and medical 
care  
Ministry of Education  Internet education information service 
National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) 
monopoly of telecommunication and internet 
service providers and balance the price of 
broadband access 
State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) 
internet intellectual property protection and 
supervision 
State Administration of Radio, 
Film and Television (SARFT) 
Internet audio and video contents permission 
State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC) 
Internet business venues including internet 
café, commodity trade and services through 
the Internet, and Internet advertisement 
permission 
General Administration of Press 
and Publication  
e-journal and e-book publication, online 
games 
State Secrecy Bureau  Internet information safety 
State Food and Drug 
Administration  
Food and drug service on Internet  
China Securities Regulatory 
Commission 
Initial public offering (IPO) Internet 
companies and listed IT companies 
(Note: Adapted from Technological Empowerment) 
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The tripartite involvement in the promoting of the Internet industry, along with 
providing some personal freedoms, managing the Internet with laws and regulations, 
and harnessing political risks with strict censorship, has been adopted since the 
Party-state embraced the Internet in 1994.66 Over the years, a dense network with 
coercive power of the state to monitor the flow of information in China has been 
established, and involves the macro (state), middle-range (Internet content and service 
providers), and micro (individual users) levels.67
 
  
In the name of creating a clear Internet environment, the Chinese authorities have 
invested a lot in improving their blocking techniques and training specialized Internet 
police at the state level. However, a number of websites, including overseas social 
networking sites, that are liberal and opening platforms with some political sensitive 
information rather than pornography, gambling and other criminal contents have been 
blocked by the Great Fire Wall, which is the technical multi-censorship project operated 
by Chinese Public Security Ministry.    
 
At the mid-level, homegrown Internet websites are encouraged to “voluntarily” enforce 
self-censorship. As domestic Internet content and service providers (ICPs and ISPs), 
they have to comply with all administrative requirements to filter the online information, 
or else any offensive information may result in the website being forced to shut or its 
executives removed; thus, political considerations are sometimes considered more 
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urgent than profitability or market demand.   
  
At the individual level, the Internet users are shackled by real name backstage 
registration on some social networking websites, as they are constantly reminded that 
inappropriate opinions and behaviors in cyberspace could result in criminal prosecution 
and punishment, and those that disseminate rumors or dissent on the Internet will face 
detention or jail sentence.  
 
 
3.3 Government Involvement 
 
Despite a series of restrictive measures in controlling information on the Internet, the 
response of the central government seems to always be lagging behind the advance of 
information technology, and the game between the Chinese authorities and netizens has 
never stopped. As a Chinese saying goes, the higher authorities have policies, but the 
localities have their counter-measures. Netizens creatively and invincibly bypass official 
censors by using anti-blocking softwares, proxy servers, remailers, anonymous email 
services and other technical means to get access to what they want to see online, which 
conversely proves the vulnerability of the state control.68
 
  
Liu Yunshan, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s Publicity Department, admitted in 
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September 2011 that it is impossible to control all 500 million netizens, that the 
Publicity Department’s actual authority is grossly overrated, and that they face 
unprecedented challenges and network managing crises from the Internet.69 As he 
pointed out, the Internet’s destructive impact on popular confidence has indeed posed a 
serious challenge to the authoritarian government, but when Western countries focus on 
criticizing China’s Internet crackdown and censorship, they neglect to mention that the 
state has implemented proactive strategies to counteract information warfare. In 
addition to control or passive response, the Chinese government still has the option of 
making good use of the challenges, and increases its stability by engaging with the 
technology.70
 
 In fact, the Chinese central government led by the Chinese Communist 
Party has already acknowledged the importance of utilizing the Internet to its own 
benefit, and is learning to be more responsive and adaptive in information age.  
Hu Jintao, the CCP’s general-secretary, called on government officials at a study session 
of the party’s Political Bureau of the Central Committee in January 2007 to guide online 
public opinions by using technologies and improving their ability to administer the 
Internet.71
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the central government’s ambition and determination is to counter the challenges 
brought by the Internet. 
 
(1) Informationizing the government at all levels to enhance e-governance. The 
authorities acknowledge that the Internet contributes significantly to the increasing 
demand by the public for government accountability and transparency and that it helps 
for the governments at all levels to determine the policies, channel online discourse and 
deal with emergencies efficiently. The central authorities have therefore established 
special organs to collect online information, and the think-tank in these Internet 
supervision institutions regularly report online public opinions to the top leadership as 
an internal reference. Moreover, the governments at all levels are required to launch 
official websites to publish government information and to communicate with netizens. 
According to latest statistics, by the end of 2012, more than 75,282 government 
websites would have been launched; this includes 122 central government-level 
websites, 2,314 provincial-level websites, 19,033 municipal-level websites, and 53,813 
websites run by counties and those at lower levels.72
 
 Besides government websites, 
some local governments creatively establish Internet spokespersons system to respond 
to public demand as well as interact with netizens.  
(2) Strengthening propaganda through party media websites and guiding dominant 
commercial portal websites. The Party’s mouthpiece media, such as Xinhua News 
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Agency, People’s Daily and CCTV, are encouraged to beef up their online business. 
With propaganda tasks and profits at stake, these traditional media rapidly launched 
Internet services, and several even planned to list on the stock market. As for 
commercial websites, the government adopts a carrot–and-stick policy. On the one hand, 
influential websites are required to uphold advanced culture of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, minimize negative effects, and publish more positive information to 
consolidate the CCP and central government’s authority, and the heads of IT firms and 
web portals are sometimes summoned by the Publicity Department to study the Party’s 
latest directives, so as to “strengthen self-control, self-restraint and self-discipline” in 
the name of undertaking corporate social responsibilities. On the other hand, 
administrative pressure always hangs like the proverbial sword of Damocles over the 
heads of websites.  
 
(3) Training the officials to make use of the Internet to understand public opinions. Due 
to increasing public pressure on the Internet, the governments at all levels are exploring 
effective ways to implement online crisis management, so as to alleviate the possibility 
of social conflicts and maintain stability. One important measure is to train CCP carders 
and government officials to use, or at least be familiar with, the Internet. The 
governments regularly hire experts to analyze the current situation reflected in 
cyberspace, to help them understand public discourses online, as well as teach them 
how to deal with emergencies that arise from the Internet. Internet training has become 
mandatory for China’s 80 million CCP members.  
56 
 
(4) Recruiting the Internet commentators. Besides occupying the high ground of public 
opinion, the Chinese authorities have created a special job for Internet commentators. 
They are hired and organized by the government to post favorable comments to counter 
online challenges to the authorities. According to the earliest Internet commentators 
hired by Changsha municipal government, they were to be paid 50 cents for each post, 
which led to Internet commentators being satirized as “50-cent party.” Their main task 
is to use anonymous IDs to sway and manipulate public opinion online, taking their 
orders from government supervisors.73
 
  
From harsh censorship to public opinion guidance, the Chinese government has already 
realized that “control” is not the best, nor an effective, method to channel public 
pressure in the pluralistic information age. A combined strategy of proactive tactics 
implemented along with supervision and management of Internet crises demonstrate 
that the party-state is now open to adapting to new changes in the Internet 
environment.74
 
 The interplay and mutual engagement of both authorities and netizens 
will be a long-term trend in Chinese cyberspace. In fact, the government’s determination 
and intention to become involved in molding public opinion can be seen in both tough 
measures to control, and soft strategies to involve in, the Internet.  
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Chapter Four 
How Government, Websites and Netizens Interact on Weibo 
 
China’s strict censorship of the Internet is a well-known fact that has existed since the 
Internet was introduced in the 1990s. Although information control has never been 
loosened in any significant way, the authorities still suffer from the contradiction 
between freedom of expression allowed on the Internet and the challenges brought by 
advanced technology and netizens’ demands for freedom. In the social media era, more 
and more Chinese Internet companies have entered the microblogging and social media 
market in search of profits (and, indirectly, netizens), thus empowering more netizens 
with the ability to express their opinions about any civic issue or agenda by publishing 
140-word posts without fear of immediate censorship.   
 
This new change has meant a breakthrough in the information monopoly and reshaped 
the traditional media landscape in China; more significantly, it has also transformed the 
power and interaction of three actors—government, websites and netizens—on the 
Internet. With the advancement of technology on microblogging, the sophisticated 
tripartite game seems to have become even more thrilling and equivocal. Each party on 
Weibo attempts to maximize their interests, while minimizing risks regardless of the cost. 
Therefore, their struggles usually have decisive influence to meet with public demand 
for civic agenda discussed on Weibo. In this section, I chose China's most popular and 
censored microblogging website, Sina Weibo, as my research subject. I present the 
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strategies and constraints of the three actors in some detail, and then analyze the 
sophistication of their interaction on Weibo. 
 
4.1 The Government: Effective Use or Control? 
 
Although major Weibo operators in China claim that they face the risk of being shut 
down at any time, the Chinese government intentionally keeps Weibo as the “safety 
valves” of public emotions and barometer of the public opinion.75
 
 For one thing, they 
are willing to show their sincerity to hear from the grassroots and improve their 
effectiveness; for another, the existence of Weibo provides a shortcut to control and 
manipulate public opinion so as to eliminate potential risks raised by Weibo. Thus, the 
contradiction in government strategy lies in the fact that the government should be 
responsive to the public demand on Weibo while keeping a tightened control over public 
opinion. Traditional tough measures are no longer applicable because of the rapid 
formation of the public opinion that often defies effective surveillance.  
4.1.1 Promoting e-Governance 
 
All over the world, information and communication technologies (ICT) in the past 
decade have been widely used to improve government services. The Internet enables the 
public sectors to enhance accountability, transparency and effectiveness through electric 
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means, whereas every new stage of ICT, from BBS to blogs, and nowadays Weibo, has 
also brought increasing challenges to every government. China is no exception in this 
global trend. Although the Chinese Party-state is extremely concerned about 
unfavorable contents online which could quickly and easily rally public opinion and 
even provoke social unrest, they understand that the introduction of Weibo, albeit 
inevitable, has changed sociocultural values in China.  
 
Obviously, Weibo is the most direct and effective way to understand and test public 
opinion on any public agenda, record attitudes of satisfaction, and to gather criticism, 
grievance and apathy from the grassroots. A government that is able to give some 
degree of freedom for grassroots to discuss their opinions and to show their concern and 
endeavor to tackle social problems in response to public demands would gain more 
applause and support from the grassroots, and that would go a long way to help the state 
consolidate its legitimacy and accountability. The authorities have already realized this 
strategic importance to actively utilize and engage with Weibo, as they call for public 
institutions, securities bureaus at all levels, government officials and Party cadres to 
open personal Weibo accounts to communicate with the masses so as to better serve the 
people and improve their governance as well as cope with emergencies effectively.  
 
For many cadres, Weibo could be used in many imaginative ways. In August 2011, 
Malan Village in Shaanxi Province encountered difficulty in selling potatoes; the local 
officials strived for more channels to promote the sale of potatoes, which was the 
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primary income for many of the peasants. Yang Fuli, deputy director of Malan village 
committee, established personal accounts with Sina Weibo, and attempted to seek 
opportunities online (Figure 6). The information was rapidly forwarded and 
disseminated by tens of thousands of Weibo users. Purchase orders poured in nationwide; 
within three months, Malan village sold out 7,000 tons of potatoes via Weibo marketing. 
To this end, the town government posted an acknowledgment on Sina Weibo and 
relevant websites, thanking all warmhearted netizens. It was one of many cases at the 
primary level of rural governments in China that successfully solved practical problems 
via social media.  




In addition to the local government’s active marketing and promotion, the central 
government and their ministries have also attempted to show their sincerity and 
                                                        
76 Screenshot of Sina Weibo post, accessed September 1, 2011, http://e.weibo.com/2318781274/xk1an9nPw . 
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efficiency by making good use of Weibo.  
 
In February 2012, I experienced the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
meeting the demand from ordinary Weibo users with regard to a Chinese overseas 
student I met at Manila airport. The girl was refused entry to the Philippines because her 
visa documents were incomplete and she was compelled to stay in the transfer lounge, 
an isolated space without food, drink or Internet access. For over 15 hours, she could do 
nothing but wait, with the worst scenario being repatriation to China.  
 
After knowing about her predicament, before boarding the plane, I assured her that I 
would send out a message through microblogging soon as I had access to the Internet, 
which I did, requesting "Wai Jiao Xiao Ling Tong" (Official Weibo account of China's 
Foreign Affairs Ministry) on Sina Weibo to help her. (Figure 7)  
 
The post was quickly forwarded thousands of times within hours. Unexpectedly, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded quickly via “Wai Jiao Xiao Ling Tong.” They 
immediately contacted the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, and officials were sent 
to the airport to resolve the issue. With the combined effort and help from all sides, the 





Figure 7: China's Foreign Ministry's Response in Answer to My Request on Sina 





No matter creative strategies using social media at the grassroots level to sell potatoes 
or responding quickly at the central ministerial level to public demands, the Chinese 
governments at all levels have demonstrated a degree of sincerity in using Weibo to 
serve the citizenry. At least they currently have incentives to explore new ways to better 
accommodate changes brought by social media, and make good or effective use of 
Weibo to win public support in their bid to consolidate their ruling position.  
 
                                                        
77 Screenshot of Sina Weibo Post. Accessed February 22, 2012, http://www.weibo.com/1938330147/y5LN54y6g . 
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4.1.2 Multiple measures combined with hard and soft control 
 
Although Weibo creates one more channel for the government to communicate with 
those at the bottom and improve their governance, nevertheless, the technology also 
brings about plenty of challenges to the accountability and authority of the Party-state. 
Content involving politically sensitive issues or figures, extreme criticism or even 
malicious attacks on the current regime usually raise the authorities’ concern. Therefore, 
they often explore ways and implement a series of measures to control unfavorable 
information on Weibo so as to minimize political risks in cyberspace that may trigger 
social unrests in the real world.  
 
(a) Hard control 
 
Hard control is a conventional method the Chinese government has used in the past 
decade to control the Internet. In view of the rapid development of information 
technology, the government has never loosened vigilance against politically sensitive 
content on the Internet. In the social media era, the government invests vast amounts of 
money to explore more effective and applicable measures to target microblogging in 





① Technically: Great Fire Wall (GFW) 
As early as 2003, the Chinese authorities set up its national gatekeeper—the Great 
Firewall (GFW, in short), a technological sophisticated integrated censoring system 
monitored by Chinese Public Security Ministry—to block IP addresses of websites or to 
filter political sensitive contents, particularly with regard to overseas websites. As the 
Chinese government has no right to require overseas websites to implement censorship, 
“blockade” becomes the common means for the government to cope with negative 
information. Over the years, many overseas websites, including Facebook and Twitter 
have been blocked, and the Internet in China has been successfully turned into a 
nationwide intranet in which most Chinese netizens are separated from the outside 
world by the GFW. 
 
② Legislatively: Microblogging Regulations and Real-name Registration  
On December 16, 2011, Beijing municipal government issued new 
Weibo/microblogging regulations, which required all users to register with their real 
names. This real-name registration rule should be implemented within three months. 
One week later, Guangdong also required seven microblogging websites, including 
Tencent and Fanfou, to carry out real-name registration. According to new regulations, 
all microblogging users need to submit their ID cards or passport number, or else their 
posts and comments on microblogging would be restricted. 78
                                                        
78 Yu Jincui, “Real Names on Weibo Points to Progress”, Global Times, December19, 2011. Accessed December30, 
2011, 
 In addition, some 
websites acknowledge that they have implemented an indirect registration procedure 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/688919/Real-names-on-Weibo-points-to-progress.aspx . 
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that requires microblogging accounts to be linked to the users’ mobile phones. By 
March 16, 2012, almost all dominant microblogging websites in Beijing and Shenzhen 
have completed the real-name registration.  
 
③ Administratively: Pressure tactics and crackdown  
In contrast to technological and legislative measures, administrative orders are most 
commonly used by the authorities to put pressure on Chinese Internet companies and to 
crack down on unfavorable information posted to Weibo, especially for suppressing the 
dissemination of sudden-breaking incidents or politically sensitive contents on the 
Internet.  
 Shut down independent microblogging websites 
Before Chinese major web portals launched Weibo products, the Chinese 
microblogging service was initiated by domestic independent microblogging 
websites. Due to limited influence and the small scale on which they operated, they 
hardly attracted the attention of the authorities until July 2009, when the 
microblogging platform played a significant role in disseminating graphic accounts 
and images of the Urumqi Riot. To the horror of the public security agency, 
information about Urumqi Riot disseminated and updated by grassroots on Fanfou 
and other independent microblogging sites turned out to be more graphic and bloody 
than the official accounts and uncontrollable in its flow and outreach. It was then that 
the party-state realized the power of this new media, and the government urgently 
exerted extreme pressure and finally shut down Fanfou. Within days, almost all 
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independent social networking sites in China were shut down in the name of market 
regulation. Some of these operators were not allowed to reopen until two years later, 
when dominant web portals occupied most of the market. Ironically, the smaller 
Weibo operators have become victims of the Urumqi Riot.  
 
 State Internet Information Office (SIIO)  
On May 4, 2011, the government announced that the establishment of Internet 
Information Office (SIIO) to manage and supervise Internet content. Wang Chen, 
director of the State Council’s Information Office, was concurrently appointed SIIO 
director. Although the SIIO is regarded as the top supervisory body for the Internet, 
under the purview of the state council, it does not preclude other ministries and 
departments from interfering with Internet management. Instead, the setting up of 
SIIO demonstrates the party-state’s determination of taking a further step to control 
Internet information, particularly on social media. Based on China’s administration 
styles, once there is a central organ, there will be more sub-organs at all local levels. 
Therefore, local governments need to responsively invest more human resources and 
finance to set up more subordinate offices to implement administrative orders from 
the top.  
 
 Crack down rumors on Weibo 
In November 2011, thirty-nine heads of China’s top Internet and telecom companies, 
including dominant microblogging service providers, were required to attend a 
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three-day meeting sponsored by the SIIO. The objective of the meeting was to 
remind Internet companies to “strengthen their self-management, self-restraint and 
strict self-discipline,” and in intensify their controls to counter Internet rumors; all of 
the representatives pledged to tighten their internal operations.79
 
 Many speculated 
that the government’s sudden move could have been the result of widespread 
politically sensitive information on microblogging, even including rumors on the 
supposed death of former President Jiang Zemin, which most certainly annoyed the 
top leadership.  
Less than six months later, in March 2012, the government tightened their grip again 
to crack down on new “rumors.” Two popular microblogging websites, Sina Weibo 
and Tencent Weibo, popular with millions of users, were criticized and punished as it 
was assumed that they were major platforms for producing and disseminating 
rumors. Both were forced to shut down for three days, from March 31 to April 3, 
2012, and netizens could not post comments during that time while the companies 
“cleaned up” their websites. Six netizens were arrested and sixteen other websites 
were shut down because for allegedly spreading coup rumors on the Internet.80
 
  
Notwithstanding that the Chinese Communist Party and the central government keep 
emphasizing the significance of cracking down rumors in the name of cleansing 
cyberspace, in reality, they are not able to indicate specifics of the purported rumor; 
                                                        
79 Loretta Chao and Owen Fletcher, “China Web Executives Make Pledge”, Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2011, 
accessed January 11, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204621904577017801506511284.html . 
80 Fang Yang, “ Websites Closed, Six Detained for Spreading Rumors”, Xinhua News Agency, March 3, 2012, 
accessed April 15, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/31/c_122911627.htm . 
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therefore, all unverified information on microblogging, particularly information 
containing politically sensitive discourse, negative and anti-government contents, are 
all attributed to rumors. In fact, what caused the authorities’ concern are not merely 
fake information or rumors but negative truth and freewheeling discussions on 
microblogging that could raise public contention, grievance and resentment, and 
possibly result in social unrests offline, and perhaps threaten the political regime. 
 
(b) Soft control  
 
① Foster dominant portal websites to occupy the microblogging market 
On August 14, 2009, a month after the government had closed all independent 
microblogging websites, Sina Corp. unexpectedly launched its microblogging product. 
Sina rapidly emerged as a leading actor in China’s microblogging market and became 
the largest microblogging platform within months. Early on, Sina had set itself apart 
from previous independent microblogging service providers; the company is large 
enough to attract famous artists, well-known journalists, leading entrepreneurs, 
influential scholars, and tens of thousands of followers, but it is even more dependent 
on the government, because of its size. It is not difficult to speculate that Sina Weibo’s 
success is inseparable from government support, or implicit consent, as no other 
company was able to increase its market share without obstacle post-crackdown. In 
other words, the authorities intentionally promote homegrown major web portals to 
occupy the market on condition that they are willing to accept censorship and control.  
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② Encourage more leading websites to launch the microblogging business 
The more Sina Weibo users grow, the more likely it generates power from increasing 
netizens. The government is unwilling to allow any website to monopolize China’s 
microblogging market, out of fear that public opinion may aggregate in one platform; 
thus, the government has openly encouraged more Chinese internet companies to 
compete in the microblogging market. Before the first half of 2010, three other 
dominant web portals—Sohu, Netease and Tencent—launched their own microblogging 
products in succession; a number of Party or official media websites, such as People’s 
Daily and China Central Television, also initiated microblogging services. Since then, 
China’s microblogging has ushered in an era of explosive growth, but cautiously 
marked with official or semi-official material even though they mostly are 
private-owned. The power of public opinion has therefore scattered into different 
platforms and, to some extent, minimized chances of political contention and potential 
risks.  
 
③  Hiring the “50-cent Party” to speak for the government and the CCP 
The “50-cent Party” comprises full-time and part-time Internet commentators hired by 
the authorities to speak for the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party. 
They are reportedly paid 50 cents for every post, which accounts for the moniker 
conferred on them by netizens. Their major job is to issue pro-government or pro-CCP 
posts using anonymous identities or Internet service providers for the purpose of 
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shaping public opinion on the Internet. The “50-cent Party” can be traced to 2004, when 
the Changsha local government paid a number of Internet commentators to counter 
unfavorable political information. Although the “50-cent Party” was not specially 
created for microblogging, they play an important role in swaying online public opinion, 
and their ranks have increased, even though there are no accurate statistics on their 
exact numbers. 
 
④ Requiring public security bureaus, party cadres and government officials at all levels 
to open microblogging accounts 
The year 2011 has been dubbed “the Government Weibo Year,” as the total number of 
microblogging accounts set up in the name of public institutions, government and 
official is now 50,000.81
                                                        
81 “Information Minister Urges Better Use of Government Blogs”, China.org.cn, January 19, 2012. Accessed March 
7, 2012, 
 (The number may include official accounts set up under 
different names on various microblogging sites). This achievement is obviously 
inseparable from top-down mobilization. Wang Chen, the leader in charge of Internet 
information regulation, repeatedly stressed the necessity and urgency for all party 
members and government officials to establish Weibo accounts, but ironically he does 
not have any Weibo account in his name on any microblogging site. The Central 
Committee of Communist Youth League also actively promotes Communist Youth 
League organizations and staff members at all levels to open Weibo accounts, in March 
2012, Implementation Suggestions for China Communist Youth League Conducting 
Work by Widely Using Weibo as the first explicit requirement issued by central-level 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-01/19/content_24442353.htm . 
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Of course, from the perspective of political stability, not all censorship and control cases 
are too urgent or sensitive. There are two special cases of top-down censoring that 
should be taken into account. One is that control is just for control’s sake. Officials and 
staff working in propaganda or Internet-regulation relevant organs often set up control 
plans and objectives regularly, so as to take credit or report to their superiors their 
outstanding work performance. The other situation is that some powerful officials often 
abuse their power to coerce websites into censoring negative information that targets 
themselves to keep the problem information from getting in their way of promotion. 
 
 
4.2 Websites/Internet Companies: Survival or Profits? 
 
In the microblogging era, we can no longer ignore or underestimate the role of Internet 
companies in the government-website-netizen equation. Their decision-making between 
survival and sustainability or profits not only impacts their own business development, 
but can also influence both the state and society.  
 
                                                        
82 “Implementation Suggestions for China Communist Youth League Conducting Work by Widely Using Weibo”, 
General Office of Central Committee of China Communist Youth League, March 1, 2012, accessed in May 15, 2012. 
http://www.ccyl.org.cn/documents/zqbf/201208/t20120823_589466.htm . 
Na Diya, “China Communist Youth League Requires All Organizations to Open Weibo”. Southern Metropolis, May 5, 
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4.2.1 Dilemma of Survival or Profits 
 
Theoretically, listed companies in the private sector should only be concerned about 
how to expand their market share, how to satisfy their clients and how to make more 
profit. But things are different in China’s Internet industry; the nature of information 
products provided by these Internet companies is non-materialistic and unpredictable, 
and they are unlikely to get rid of government interference. Moreover, what users post 
on microblogging is unpredictable; some unfavorable contents could offend the 
government or trigger political risks, which may lead to the business being forced to 
shut. Thus, most microblogging sites in China choose to comply with governmental 
orders to exert censorship when needed.  
 
But when they tighten control and self-censor information to please the government, 
they also face another risk of offending netizens and losing customers, where the 
consequence could be great economic loss. This quandary seems always to exist in the 
context of information control in China where ”survival of the fittest” is a principle that 
applies to the Internet sector as well, and companies that are smart enough to obey 
governmental orders can grow and boom. Sina is a good example, even though it is not 
a state-owned company. Thus, I choose Sina Weibo as my target to analyze its complex 
strategies, as which is the country’s largest and most successful, and also much of the 
most dramatic conflicts and tension between the parties are always displayed on it. 
 
73 
4.2.2 An Overview of Sina Weibo 
 
Sina Weibo was launched in mid-August, 2011, when all independent microblogging 
sites in China had just experienced a severe crackdown by the government because of 
the Urumqi Riot. Initially, Sina concentrated only on how to attract more users and 
perfect the product, aiming to build a social-networking platform in China. Following 
the celebrity-driven strategy adopted in promoting their blog product, Sina mobilized its 
staff to invite popular artists, public figures and well-known entrepreneurs to establish 
blogging accounts in Sina Weibo. At first, staffs were required to meet a marketing 
quota every week, inviting one celebrity and two journalists, and to persuade them to 
publish at least seven posts. 83
 
 
More celebrities attracted more followers, and microblogging users on Sina Weibo 
quickly snowballed in a short period of time. Within three months, there were a million 
accounts, and six months later, had reached 10 million. Internally, the company 
expanded from a dozen of employees to 200, and Weibo Business was set up as an 
independent department in March 2010. 84  In middle 2011, Sina moved Weibo 
supporting team to Tianjin, including “Weibo Xiao Mi Shu” (Weibo Secretaries) and 
other customer service staff members, in consideration of cost caused by rapid 
expansion.85
                                                        
83 Note: Interview anonymous Sina staff member by phone, Feburary, 2011.  
 By the middle of 2012, there have been more 1000 staff work in Sina 
84  Li Bin, “Sina Set up Weibo Department”, Beijing Times, April 3, 2010, accessed September 8, 2011, 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2010-04-03/03534018520.shtml . 
85 Note: Weibo Secretaries (Weibo Xiao Mi Shu) are professional administrators who are in charge of Weibo posts 
censorship.  
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Weibo Department,  80% of which employed as Weibo Secretary are responsible for 
Weibo post censorship. 86
 
 
Compared with other dominant portal websites, Sina is the early mover to occupy the 
microblogging market, and keeps a commanding advantage in both the number of users 
and investment, but they still regard latecomers Tencent, Sohu and Netease as serious 
competitors. 87 Moreover, traditional media such as People’s Daily, China Central 
Television (CCTV) and Hong Kong Phoenix TV also became involved in the 
microblogging business. After 505 days suspension, Fanfou.com, the largest 
independent microblogging website in China, has resumed operation since November 




In their efforts to increase users’ activity and stickiness, Sina continues to invest in 
infrastructure, technology and marketing of Weibo; services and applications are free to 
all. Sina, together with five other companies, invested 200 million yuan (at least 
US$33million, half of which was put up by Sina) to develop the third-party applications 
in 2010; the value-added revenue reflected the investment put in by Sina and developer 
platform in the 3:7 proportion; the added boom further stimulates Sina to add another 
US$100 million investment in the microblogging platform to increase users’ activity 
and secure its market-topping position, even though it reported a net loss of US$336 
                                                        
86 Note: Interview an anonymous Sina staff member by phone, June 27, 2012. 
87 Refer to Appendix I 
88 Gady Epstein. “Sina Weibo”, Forbes Asia Magazine, March.14, 2011, accessed December 21, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2011/0314/features-charles-chao-twitter-fanfou-china-sina-weibo.html . 
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million in the third quarter of 2011. 89
 
 Although the initial investment caused 
profitability to decline, Sina’s focus is on the long-term. Based on US $120 million 
investment in 2011, Sina continued to invest another US $160 million in 2012 
All these efforts aim at business development and market share. Besides finance and 
technology investment, Sina intentionally expands their user base from the grassroots to 
the government and officials. This move objectively wins the authorities’ support and 
further consolidates its dominance in the market. According to the statistics, there are 
more than 18,000 government accounts in Sina Weibo, 9,778 of which are owned by 
public institutions. Nearly half of government official Weibo accounts were opened by 
public security bureaus at all levels for the purpose of maintaining stability both online 
and offline, which manifests the government’s determination to occupy microblogging 
platform and monitor public opinion. 
 
4.2.3 The Basic Principle of Censorship and Attention-diverting Strategy  
 
One of the most important missions for websites is to create or discover new topics to 
maintain the users’ attention, since the traffic of users means more profits for websites. 
As long as the topic stirs public attention and enthusiasm, the microblogging service 
providers will do all it can to amplify its influence, such as creating special pages for 
users to discuss, placing the topic in prominent columns or banner, updating the relevant 
                                                        
89 “Web Portal Sina Posts $336 million Quarterly Loss”, Associate Press, November 9, 2011, accessed April 9, 2012, 
http://sg.news.yahoo.com/portal-sina-posts-336-million-quarterly-loss-103033726.html . 
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information timely, etc.  
 
However, politically sensitive agenda on microblogging are usually constrained by the 
authorities, and the websites are required to strengthen self-management and 
self-censorship so as to abide by Chinese law and shoulder its “corporate social 
responsibility”; therefore, not all hot topics that attracts public attention are promoted by 
microblogging service providers. When a topic involves significant politically sensitive 
contents or figures, websites would implement self-censorship and attention-diverting 
strategies even without administrative orders from the government so as to minimize 
political risks, instead of fueling a public frenzy to raise public interest.  
 
(1) Self-censorship by Internet Companies 
 
Although private entities, Internet companies in China are still largely constrained by 
the government, because the government is in charge of issuing Internet service 
provider (ISP) licenses. Companies must obtain the proper license before they can 
operate. The licenses must be renewed annually; this puts pressure on the Internet firm 
to abide by governmental regulations and requirements.   
 
Typically, the authorities issue administrative orders on information censorship, but 
there are no specified criteria the companies can refer to; therefore, whether their 
internal control and censorship works is largely dependent on their own judgment and 
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investment. No website dares take the risk to offend the government, and dominant 
Internet companies prefer to cooperate with the authorities, so as to gain more support 
to expand, or at least guarantee their business will survive.  
 
As China’s premier microblogging website, Sina Weibo has commanded 56.5% of 
China’s microblogging market share based on active users and 86.6% based on 
browsing time by March 2011.90
 
 Sina’s CEO, Charles Chao, repeatedly announced that 
it would increase investment in censorship in the second half of 2011, when the 
government started to press all Internet companies to strengthen information control, as 
the train collision in Wenzhou on July 23, 2011 had triggered an avalanche of public 
anger and criticism on the microblogging platform.  
It seems an impossible mission to filter billions of information produced by millions of 
users every day, but the pressure has been put on Sina Corp. to enhance and invest in 
censorship technology and human resources; even if they cannot predict what individual 
users will post beforehand, they have successfully developed a three-tier censorship 
system that indeed helps to restrict some politically contents or figures to some degree.  
 
(a) First level: Technological Filtering  
 
Under great pressure from the government, Sina Weibo keeps increasing its investment 
                                                        
90 Sina Weibo Report, China International Capital Corporation, March 3, 2011.  
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in censorship technological R&D. Automatic filtering system is the first threshold, 
where any information containing sensitive words or contents are automatically deleted. 
Blacklisting and blocking key words is a normal measure for microblogging sites to 
implement censorship. A China Digital Times research shows that at least 1100 Chinese 
words were blocked from search in Sina Weibo between April 2011 and March 2012. 
Additionally, Sina Weibo also develops its filtering and censorship technology to delay 




(b) Second level: Manual Censorship 
 
Sina has employed at least 300 personnel round the clock to mind its Weibo business by 
March 2012, and a third of them are specially responsible for filtering and censorship of 
Weibo posts.92
 
  (Figure 8) The monitoring team and editorial team of Sina Weibo 
reportedly keep constant watch on what gets posted; and the staffsare empowered to 
report problematic information at any time, being particularly tasked to monitor key 
opinion leaders and influential and outspoken microbloggers. The second level is 
largely to ensure that the sensitive contents or information missed by the automated 
system at the first level are able to be controlled and censored manually.  
                                                        
91 Note: sensitive key words list of Sina Weibo, China Digital Times, accessed April 6, 2012, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/新浪微博搜索敏感词列表/ . 
92 “Sina’s Political Awareness”, Phoenix Weekly, March 2012, vol. 7, accessed April 17, 2012, 
http://www5.cnfol.com/big5/zggng.stock.cnfol.com/120306/129,1402,11915266,00.shtml .  
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Figure 8: A “Monitoring Editor” Job Ad Posted on Sina Weibo93
   
 
 
(c) Final barrier: Top Check  
In response to the government’s requirement, Sina Weibo was the first to set up a 
professional “rumor buster’s team” consisting of 10 veteran editors to monitor, check 
and buster the spreading rumors every day, particularly targeting fake information, 
inaccurate information and online fraud.94
 
 Chen Tong, its chief-editor, is the top leader 
of the rumor buster team that double-checks every post to be published by Sina official 
rumor buster account. When they have traced a rumor to its source, they then announce 
that they are suspending or deleting the account.  
The multi-layer supervision of censorship is aimed at limiting outspoken celebrities and 
contents that maliciously defames the CCP, government and significant officials. 
Although dissidents, separatists and overseas democratic activists and other politically 
                                                        
93 Paul Mozur, “Is This What a Chinese Internet Censor Job Ad Looks Like?” Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2012, 
accessed May 30, 2012, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/05/21/is-this-what-a-chinese-internet-censor-job-ad-looks-like/. 
  Note: the post appeared on Sina Weibo on May 21, 2012, but soon deleted.   
94 Zhang Sha, “Sina Launched Weibo Rumor Buster Team”, Chongqing Daily, Septemebr19, 2011, accessed 
October17, 2011, http://cq.cqnews.net/sz/2011-09/19/content_8326392.htm .  
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sensitive figures are not allowed to open accounts or publish posts by using their real 
names on any Chinese domestic microblogging website, it does not mean all users are 
completely forbidden to discuss any political discourses or criticize the government and 
the state. The purpose of censorship in China nowadays is mainly to reduce probability 
of collective actions and curtailing collective activities by silencing comments that 
represent, reinforce or spur social mobilization.95
 
 And indeed, these strict measures 
have minimized the dissemination of unfavorable information on Weibo to a certain 
extent.  
Even so, Sina still acknowledges that they may not always be able to effectively control 
or restrict all of the contents posted and forwarded by millions of users every day, and 
uncertainty of government policies also negatively influence the business. In the annual 
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and released in April 
2012, Sina stressed that the company remains potentially liable for any content on 
Weibo that the authorities deemed inappropriate and/or unlawful. And they recognized 
that, although required by the authorities, the actual act of deleting deleterious content 





                                                        
95 Gary King, Jenifer Pan and Margaret Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but 
Silences Collective Expression” (Working paper of American Political Science Association 2012 Annual Meeting), 
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(2) Attention-diverting Strategy  
 
Attention-diverting strategy is already a common measure for all Internet companies in 
China to cooperate with the government’s censorship orders. Being profit-driven, Sina 
is unwilling to offend both the government and their customers; while adhering to 
government regulations is required for licensing, keeping customers happy determines 
their profits. When there is a way to attract more users without harming their business, 
they are inclined to adopt it to achieve a win-win result.  
 
As a soft measure, the attention-diverting strategy mainly includes creating and 
recommending more entertainment and commercial topics, developing apps for games 
and commercial events, and improving multi-functions, etc. To increase functionality, 
Sina Weibo has, since October 2011, transformed its interface from a single informative 
version to a multi-functional version.  
 
Compared with the previous version, the most important improvement in service is that 
the new display is more dazzling and diversified. More columns have been added to 
create and update interesting hot topics and events, except for sensitive political issues. 
The new display seems compatible with online advertisements, entertainment and 
games apps, and can keep users active and divert at least some of their attention from 
sensitive contents. (Figure 9) 
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Figure 9: New Version of the Interface on Sina Weibo Incorporating More 




In addition, Sina Weibo keeps working on attracting more and more enterprises to open 
accounts. In June 2011, Sina launched its enterprise edition to enable companies and 
institutions to establish their own homepages with more functions as needed. By the end 
of March 2012, less than a year from launch, more than 130,000 enterprises have signed 
up with Sina Weibo, including 143 of the world’s Fortune 500 Companies and 207 
Chinese Top 500 Firms. These enterprises regard Weibo as a free marketing channel to 
promote their products and services or to manage crisis; according to Sina Enterprise 
Weibo’s White Paper of 2012, each enterprise account has over 5,000 followers, with 
                                                        
97 Screenshot of Sina Weibo, accessed May 15, 2012, http://www.weibo.com/wangtongbbi .  
83 
each Sina Weibo user following an average of four enterprise accounts and 56% 
following at least one enterprise account.98
 
  
Companies issue and update business-related information on Weibo, which obviously 
dilutes the sensitivity of total information; in particular, a considerable amount of public 
attention can be diverted from politically sensitive topics and corporate risks from 
uncertain public opinion can be minimized while, at the same time, consolidating users’ 
stickiness for the Weibo provider. Within two years from start of operations, Sina Weibo 
has 130,000 enterprises accounts, approximately 250 million registered users, and 
200,000 apps.99
  
 All these have created a commercial value base for Sina to expand its 
market share and attract investment.  
However, in their 2011 annual report submitted to US Securities and Exchange, Sina 
noted that there were flaws in exploring effective monetization models for Weibo, that 
they were pushing ahead with commercialization strategies for 2012 and were planning 
to increase cooperation with all levels of advertisers, game developers, search engine 
companies, as well as mobile service providers, and to continue to invest an additional 
US$160 million in microblogging services in 2012.100
                                                        
98 2012 Sina Enterprise Weibo White Paper, Sina Weibo & CIC, March 21, 2012.  
 With added pressure from the 
tightening policy and increased investments, the net income of Sina has been declining 
since mid-2011, which pushes Sina to accelerate its commercialization process. In the 
99 Xu Jieyun, “How does Sina Increase Monetizing Weibo”, First Financial Daily, March1, 2012, accessed April 17, 
2012, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/tech/2012/03/01011912376477.shtml . 
100 Xue Song, “Sina is about to Invest US$160m in Weibo”, Guangzhou Daily, February29, 2012, accessed April 9, 
2012, http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2012-02/29/content_1626023.htm .  
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monetizing process, more commercial resources would play significant role in attracting 
users and further shift the attention of Chinese netizens from serious topics to 
entertainment and business.  
 
 
4.3 Netizens/Weibo Users: Voice or Noise? 
 
By the end of 2011, the number of China’s Weibo users numbered 250 million; 
according to the 29th report from China Internet Network Information Services, Weibo 
has seen a staggering growth of 296% in China in 2011 alone. However, this number, 
while worth noting, does not mean that these hundreds of millions users actively 
participate in the discussion of civic agenda on Weibo, as daily active users only 
approximately account for 10% of the total registered number. Many never or seldom 
publish posts or comments, prefer instead to lurk on Weibo to obtain information from 
others. Moreover, it is common for users to register several different Weibo accounts on 
the same website or on different sites, and these likely accounts do swell the number of 
users.   
  
Admittedly, new features have made it possible for individuals to produce and share 
information and netizens have gained more freedom and opportunities in cyberspace. 
Individuals and enterprises, celebrities and grassroots, old and young share the same 
platform to express their opinions through posting, forwarding and comment, and Weibo 
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seems to have become an indispensable channel for Chinese netizens to better 
understand the society, and it also provides a window for the government and corporate 
world to hear the voice at the grassroots level. The excitement of Weibo users can be 
easily fueled by any interesting topic, such as political, business, entertainment and, in 
particular, sudden-breaking issues. In the process of forwarding and commenting, Weibo 
amplifies the influence of information generated by hundreds of thousands, perhaps 
millions, and the power of public opinion gradually adds pressure to the relevant parties.  
 
However, in light of Internet control and censorship issues, not all information and 
topics can be successfully disseminated on Weibo. For the purpose of cracking down on 
Internet rumors and false information required by the authorities, Internet companies 
enforce automatic and manual filtering, and unfavorable posts containing politically 
sensitive contents or figures are always deleted or hidden.  
 
Despite resentment and frustration, most Chinese netizens seem to have become used to 
the game of “Whack-a-mole,” resulting in more bans issued by the authorities, and more 
challenges from the grassroots, creating a virtually endless cycle. But Weibo users are 
aware that the most effective way is not to play hardball with the censorship rules, but 
to make a detour by avoiding the use of blacklisted key words to convey their opinions. 
More and more netizens seem to form a tacit understanding when discussing taboo 




Those that are keen to discuss politically sensitive issues on Weibo are a comparatively 
small minority. The majority of netizens show little concern about civic agenda or issues, 
regarding Weibo as a tool to entertain or “kill time.”  
 
In addition, key opinion leaders with hundreds of thousands of followers on Weibo 
usually deserve “special consideration”; because of their influence, they are closely 
monitored and are warned or punished for posting information containing certain key 
words or sensitive content, and in extreme instances, may be blocked from publishing 
posts for a number of days. However, it is interesting that the same information they 
post shows different results in different Weibo platforms; posts that are blocked or 
deleted by Sina may nevertheless be allowed to exist on other Weibo websites. 
Therefore, some outspoken intellectuals express their discontent by “leaving.”  
 
Active Weibo opinion leaders such as Lian Yue, the famous China columnist, Zhang 
Ming, professor of Renmin University of China, Chang Ping, China’s leading journalist 
forcedly or voluntarily announced that they were leaving Sina Weibo because of its 
perceived over-censorship, and opened new accounts elsewhere. To some extent, this is 
a heavy loss for Sina, as a number of followers of these influential opinion leaders are 
likely to switch to Sina’s rivals.  
 
Other liberal intellectuals appear to be tough and resilient, continuing to post their 
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thoughts on Weibo despite having been censored or blocked. Scholars Xiao Han and 
Guo Yuhua are examples of those that immediately set up new accounts after Sina 
Weibo has deleted their existing ones, and even though they know they would likely be 
banned within a short time. Renowned Chinese authors such as Han Han do not fear 
censorship, as they believe their writing has already been widely disseminated by the 
public before being censored or deleted. Grassroots on Weibo have mixed feelings about 
the censorship: they may complain about being censored but are already used to it, and 
they understand why the websites have no choice but to do so.    
 
 The Features of China’s Weibo users 
 
(1) The public attention and opinions are easily manipulated. It is easy to conclude that 
the success of Sina Weibo is based on two critical factors: celebrity-driven strategy and 
topic-driven strategy. On the one hand, they do all they can to invite more celebrities to 
open accounts to attract more followers but on the other hand, they try to produce and 
promote heated topics every minute to increase users’ activity. Both strategies 
subsequently lead to two results: one is that celebrities on Weibo have a stronger voice 
than the grassroots, thus their opinions are easily disseminated and influence their 
followers; the other is that topics on Weibo are numerous, and netizens can never 
concentrate on one topic for long.  
 
Soon as one issue becomes the public focus, another hotspot emerges, and the original 
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topic rapidly fades away or is forgotten; thus, some Weibo operators make use of the 
unsustainable characteristic of public attention on Weibo to continuously create new 
topics to manipulate public opinion in order to minimize political risks. Some 
companies also hire people, similar to the government’s strategy of employing “50-cent 
Party,” for commercial purposes to write and generate posts that will produce fake 
hotspots or affect public opinion.  
 
(2) Noise is louder than voice. The voice of millions of Chinese netizens on civic topics 
amplified by Weibo sometimes plays an important role in public agenda, but it does not 
mean that all Weibo users, or most of them, are really concerned about the issues. In 
other words, the vision of users on Weibo is largely dependent on whom they follow, 
and this is partly determined by their age groups. Hundreds of millions of Weibo users 
comprise people from all walks of life.  
 
Their interests and concerns, to a large extent, are dependent on various factors, 
including their age, educational background, careers, where they live, their personal 
relevance, whom they follow on Weibo, etc. Different values and judgments come after 
conflicting topics, and it is unrealistic to expect a collective appeal or consensus on a 
certain issue, based simply on Weibo posts. Therefore, the power of public opinion on 
Weibo is usually reflected in promoting and disseminating a topic rather than solving the 
underlying problem.  
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(3) Pro-entertainment tendency. One significant feature differentiates China’s Weibo 
from similar social media overseas: Weibo is more entertainment-oriented than 
informative. This is because dominant Weibo platform operators deliberately promote 
entertainment and other commercial information to avoid triggering too much emotional 
outbursts from the grassroots or offending the government and a large number of Weibo 
users in China are apolitical or politically apathetic about topics concerning politics or 
livelihood; the other reason is the majority of Weibo users are comparatively young, 60% 
of Weibo users in both Sina and Tencent are under the age of thirty 101, those who are 
born in 1990s and 2000s even accounts for 37%.102 This group of younger generation 
grow up in the context of China’s Opening up and Reform, and few had experienced 
significant political turmoil or social unrests; they are well-educated but materialistic, 
more concerned about themselves and their own interests, such as their future, money, 
friends and families, and thus only follow artists and entertainment accounts for fun, but 
show ignorance and apathy about public affairs. According to the investigation and 
reports, most junior and primary school students use Weibo as a platform for releasing 
their pressure, they neither need followers nor concern about comments.103
 
 
The celebrity ranking list on Sina Weibo demonstrates this pro-entertainment tendency. 
Public figures, particularly movie stars or pop singers, gain a lot of reputation from 
Weibo. The most popular Weibo accounts in the Top 10 list include six artists and four 
                                                        
101 Xiao Zhi, “1980s Generation Prefers Sina and Tencent Weibo”, Enfodesk Data, November 30, 2011, accessed 
February 9, 2012, http://data.eguan.cn/yiguanshuju_120638.html . 
102 2012 Weibo Investigation Report on Weibo Users Development. Sina Corp & Peking University, October 2012; 
   Yang Yajing, “Half Chinese Students in Junior and Primary Schools have Weibo accounts”, Wuhan Morning Post, 
November 16, 2012, accessed November 17, 2012, http://hb.qq.com/a/20121116/000468.htm .  
103 Ibid. 
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entertainment program hosts and hostesses, and the number of their followers all 
exceeds ten million. (Figure 10)  
Figure 10: Sina Weibo Ranking List of Top 10 in May 2012 104
 
 
There are only two well-known entrepreneurs and one best-seller in the Top 50, and one 
liberal columnist in Top 100. They cautiously share their updates and promote charity 
and public welfare on Weibo and seldom engage in discussing politically sensitive hot 
issues or civic agenda. Even Yao Chen, a famous Chinese actress, known as the “Weibo 
Queen” with more than 20 million followers who is famous for posting and sharing her 
opinions in public affairs, however increasingly shows her concerns only in helping the 
vulnerable and the poor instead of involving in sensitive social agenda.   
 
Owing to these features above, the power of public opinion on Weibo is, to some extent, 
                                                        
104 Screenshot of Sina Weibo Celebrity Ranking, accessed May5, 2012, http://data.weibo.com/top/hot/famous . 
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dependent on and constrained by various uncertain internal and external factors; the 
discussion of significant politically sensitive issues or sudden-breaking incidents on 
Weibo are often constrained by the authorities and censored by the websites. Yet, thanks 
to Weibo, more ills and injustice in the society have been exposed to the public, 
continuously challenging the creditability of the authorities and pressing them to fix 
problems.  
 
The interactions of government-websites-netizen on Weibo essentially reflect the deep 
contradictions and dilemma of the three parties. Any decision by each party is likely to 
effect a change in the balance of the trilateral relationship. Netizens express opinions by 
onlooking on Weibo; whether public opinion is strong or weak on an issue is reflected in 
the degree of government concern, which results in different administrative orders.  
 
Then the question whether “to censor or to promote” comes after the government’s 
response to public demand, and subsequently influences the Internet companies’ 
decision whether to increase investment to tighten information control or in 
commercialization and this, to a large extent, then influences their user base and activity, 
and even their profits, which eventually affects public attention and fulfillment of public 
demand on Weibo. In the process, the boundaries between actors are constantly being 
redrawn. As this interaction unfolds on Weibo, China is likely to see a growth of new 
and limited space of public engagement that sporadically sends out waves of shocks to 
sensitive nerves in contemporary China. 
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Chapter Five 
The Fulfillment of Public Demands on Weibo 
 
5.1 Case Selection 
 
With the advent of Weibo, Chinese netizens have indeed gained more public sphere on 
the Internet to discuss whatever they concern. Fragmented information and strict 
censorship on Weibo never hinder the desire of the public to get more transparency and 
explore the “truth” of public events. Since Sina Corp. initiated its Weibo service, leading 
dominant internet portals in China have all become involved in similar business, as 
demonstrated by increasing a number of Chinese Weibo users year on year. As more 
Chinese netizen get accustomed to share information on Weibo, they are much more 
dependent on such an internet-based social-networking platform. In consequence, 
numerous topics hotly discussed on Weibo take turns to occupy the public attention, 
including some topics that eventually formed an upsurge during a certain period, but 
more topics only existed for a short time, and finally submerged in the sea of 
information soon.  
 
As eye-catching information keeps updated and replaced every day, every hour, every 
minute, it is impossible to count how many topics had ever attracted the public attention 
exactly and which on earth are most heated agenda on Weibo, therefore I first narrow 
down the scope of cases for study to twenty hot topics, refereeing to Top 10 hot topics 
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on Weibo during 2010 and 2011, published by professional information-tracker 
institutions. (Table 4)  
Table 4. Hot Topics on Weibo in China 
 Top 10 Topics in 2010 105 Top 10 Topics in 2011 106
1 
 
“My father is Li Gang” * Wenzhou Train Crash * 
2 Yihuang Self-immolation Incident * Guo Meimei & China Red Cross * 
3 Shanghai Fire Incident * Photograph and Rescue Child Beggars 
4 QQ-360 Battle Free Blind Activist Lawyer Chen 
Guangcheng Movement * 
5 Author Fang Zhouzi Injured in Attack Independent candidates for the local 
People’s congress * 
6 Tang Jun’ Fake PhD Scandal "Free lunch" project for rural students 
7 Artist Zhou Libo’s “Public Toilet 
Comment” 
Official Xie Zhiqiang Sex Scandal*  
8 Changde the Corpse Grab Incident * The Death of little Yue-yue 
9 Three Weibo posts cost 3,900 RMB Yao Jiaxin Murder Case 
10 Novalist Jin Yong's Death Rumor Zhili Tax Protest * 
 
(Notes: * the political or government official-related hot topics)  
 
The themes of these hot topics on Weibo involving different figures and places varied 
from political issues like elections and human rights to people’s livelihoods. Some of 
these themes were strictly censored because of political sensitivity, while others were 
allowed to free flow; some themes were clearly presented in such a way it stirred public 
emotion against the government or relevant officials, while others only sought to arouse 
public sympathy. Based on the method of Most Similar System Design (MSSD) as 
discussed in previous chapter, I select four cases from these 20 hot topics: (1) Yihuang 
                                                        
105 Source from surveys by the third party media—China’ Youth Daily, Public Opinion Monitoring Office of People’s 
Daily Website, Tianya Community.  
106 Source from survey by Financial Digest, 21ccom.net and 21fd.cn.   
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Self-immolation Incident; (2) Free Blind Activist Lawyer Chen Guangcheng Movement; 
(3) Wenzhou Train Crash; and (4) Independent Candidates for the Local People’s 
Congress. These four cases all happened in China, actors therefore face the same 
political institution and culture, however, the fulfillments of public demands turn to be 
different, Weibo played an indispensable role in promoting them to be public topics and 
even affecting the outcomes. Netizens’ discussions and demands, the government 
response and websites’ action all become key factors that possibly shape the incidents. 
By analyzing the causes and outcomes of each case, I attempt to understand the process 
of tripartite interactions of government-website-netizen on Weibo, evaluating their 
effectiveness in terms of meeting the public demands.  
 
For the convenience of this study, I broadly divide the political sensitivity of the civic 
agenda on Weibo into high political sensitive agenda and low politically sensitive 
agenda, as for the scale of issue(s), it can also be categorized as individual-relevant case 
and collective-relevant case. Therefore, according to different nature and scale 
respectively, the four selected cases can be corresponded with a two by two matrix as 
shown below (Table 5). 
Table 5 Classification of the Cases Selection 
 Individual-relevant Issue  Collective-relevant Issue  
Low political 
sensitive topics  
(1) Yihuang Demolition Incident 
2010 
(2) Wenzhou Train Crash 2011 
High Political 
sensitive topics  
(3) Free Chen Guangcheng 
Movement 2011-2012 
(4) Independent Candidates for Local 
Elections Campaign 2011 
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5.2 Case Analysis  
 
1. Yihuang Demolition Incident     
 
Incident: Human tragedies such as self-immolation incident because of forced 
demolition occur often in contemporary and fast-developing China. However, it is 
precisely because of Weibo that the Yihuang house demolition incident rapidly became 
one of the most publicized events nationwide in 2010. The self-immolation incident 
occurred in Yihuang County, Jiangxi Province on September 10, 2012, when the Zhong 
family adopted extreme measures—setting fire to themselves to protest against the 
forced demolition of their home by the local government. The consequence of the 
confrontation and resistance resulted in three family members being critically injured, 
and one later died. However, it was far from being the end of the story. To control news 
of the incident from spreading far and wide, the local government tried to stop the local 
press from publishing the story and they also used coercion, blockade, “grabbing the 
dead,” illegal detention and other means to prevent other Zhong family members from 
getting help outside of the county. 107
 
 
The turning point did not appear until September 16, 2010, when two daughters of the 
Zhong family escaped government control and attempted to get on a plane to Beijing to 
petition the central government. The local police and officials relentlessly pursued them 
                                                        
107 Cui Xiaolin, “An Investigation of Yihuang Demolition Incident”, China Economic Weekly. October 12, 2010, 
accessed August19, 2011, http://news.sohu.com/20101012/n275545161.shtml . 
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to Nanchang Airport. Fraught with fear, the two girls locked themselves at the airport 
restroom, keeping in touch with friends and family by mobile phones. The dramatic 
“visit interception in the airport” was reported live via Weibo by renowned journalists 
when they received the Zhongs’ messages.108 The constant updates about the Zhong 
sisters on both Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo sparked significant and immediate 
concern. Deng Fei, a journalist at Phoenix Weekly, published more than 20 posts within 
three hours about the incident with the help of a local journalist in Jiangxi. As his posts 
were commented and reposted for thousands of times, the whole incident quickly 
became a public event online.109
 
 (Figure 11)  




Although the Zhong sisters failed to go to Beijing, their story was disseminated and 
                                                        
108 Wang Kai and Wu Liwei, “Zhong Sisters were Intercepted in the Petition Visit to Beijing”. Sanlian Life Weekly, 
October1, 2010, accessed September 5, 2011, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-10-01/232721209417_2.shtml. 
109 Ying Chan, “Microblogs Reshape News in China”, China Media Project of HongKong University, October12, 
2011, accessed December 22, 2011, http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/10/12/8021/. 
110 Screenshot of Sina Weibo, accessed in Sept 16, 2010, http://www.weibo.com/u/1642326133; 
Note: some posts about Yihuang Incident on Sina Weibo have already been censored.  
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amplified via Weibo and became widely known to many. Zhong Rujiu, the youngest 
daughter, inspired by the power of public opinion, later signed up for Weibo accounts on 
both Sina and Tencent websites, thereafter publishing more details about her family and 
the incident, in an effort to solicit more help for her badly burned mother and older 
sister via Weibo. 
 
Outcome: The Yihuang government and officials became the targets of public criticism 
as soon as the incident was exposed on Weibo. The an overwhelming wave of public 
opinion, supported by traditional media, public figures, public intellectuals and 
thousands of ordinary netizens, exerted an unprecedented pressure on the local 
authorities. To quell public outrage, on September 17, 2010, the second day after the 
dramatic interception at Yihuang Airport, the Fuzhou municipal government and the 
higher level government of Yihuang County announced that they would punish eight 
Yihuang County officials responsible for the self-immolation incident. Among them, 
Qiu Jianguo, Party secretary of Yihuang County and Su Jianguo, Magistrate of Yihuang 
County, were immediately suspended from office and placed under investigation, and 
one month later, the provincial government announced that the two would be removed 
from their positions. Six other officials were also dismissed because they were directly 
responsible for the self-immolation incident.111
 
  
According to Wang Cailiang, the Zhong family’s lawyer, the Yihuang government and 
                                                        
111 Liu Min et al., “Demolition Accountability Rings the Alarm”, Xinhuanet, September 20, 2010, accessed July 21, 
2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-09/20/c_13521724.htm . 
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the Zhong family reached a settlement after much negotiation. Details of the agreement 
was publicized online on September 27, 2010: the government agreed to stop 
demolishing Zhong’s house and paid the Zhong family 300,000 RMB (US$ 47,044) as 
compensation for Zhong’s death, and medical costs for Zhong’s wife and daughter for 
their injuries.112
 
 By May 2012, their medical costs had reached four million yuan 
(US$627,256).  
The Yihuang government promised to pay all medical expenses, and sent a special cadre 
on its behalf to go to Beijing to deal and follow up on the matter. One year after the 
incident, the party secretary and magistrate that had been sacked were reappointed to 
new positions. In contrast to the public grievances about the official accountability, 
lawyer Wang, on behalf of the Zhong family, did not question the government’s decision, 
believing that both men were more remotely responsible for the incident than the other 
six officials that were dismissed.  
 
Although the Yihuang incident was not the first self-immolation case as a consequence 
of forced demolition, it was the first time that a demolition incident was brought to 
public attention and denouncement via Weibo, and it was the first time that top officials 
were removed from office because of this. No one doubted that public opinion on Weibo 
played an important role in reshaping the impact of the incident, and a number of media 
outlets attributed it to the Weibo effect; many were optimistic that Weibo offered a ray of 
                                                        
112 Wang Cailiang, “Ten Demolition Incident and Its Consequences”, January13, 2011, accessed March 3, 2012, 
http://wangcailiang.blog.caixin.com/archives/13576 . 
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hope in developing China’s civil society.  
 
But why was Weibo so successful in pushing citizens to defend their rights? First, the 
nature of the forced demolition is one of common social problems in contemporary 
China and affects more people than the politically sensitive issues. In this case, all the 
victims’ family wanted was to seek a legal solution to the social injustice, and it was not 
about politically sensitive issues such as political reforms or the corruption of top 
officials within the central government.  
 
The higher political authorities in China therefore had no qualms on meting out 
punishment to the local officials responsible for the pain suffered by the family.  
Second, the case only involved county-level government and officials, who were  
neither powerful enough to control information or censorship on Weibo operated by the 
dominant Internet companies in the more developed cities, nor were they aware that 
140-word posts on microblogging would trigger great public pressure nationwide, or 
that the updated information could be easily disseminated without administrative 
interference and become known to public opinion watchers at higher levels of the 
government.  
 
Moreover, Weibo operators also intentionally promoted and allowed the issue to foment 
so as to attract more users and increase their activity. Generally, the more users 
participated in denouncing Yihuang officials, the more powerful public opinion and 
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pressure would be; the Zhong family’s persistence and the concerns from all the parties 
on Weibo added pressure on the local government, ultimately increasing the possibility 
that their demands would be fulfilled.  
 
2. Wenzhou Train Crash  
 
Incident: Two high-speed trains collided in Wenzhou, a suburb in southeast China on 
July 23, 2011. Three carriages fell off the viaduct, another was left hanging over the side. 
This accident resulted in at least 40 deaths and nearly 200 injuries, according to official 
statistics. News of the collision was first reported within an hour by netizens on Weibo 
via mobile phones; official reports followed an hour later. A passenger on the train D301 
sent out the first message on Sina Weibo at 20:38 pm, and nine minutes later, a second 
urgent message was published by another passenger; the messages were reposted 
hundreds of thousands of times, raising public concern to the highest. (Figure 12)  
 
Within 48 hours of the accident, the crash-related microblogging on Sina Weibo 
numbered 5,358,123; the posts searching for family members on Tencent Weibo reached 
4,252,346. For a moment, the news-breaking event became the focal point of public 
concern nationwide, as sympathy for the victims and the injured flooded on Weibo, but 
these emotions and opinions rapidly changed into sharp criticism and enormous 
discontent with the government’s response.  
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Figure 12: The First Two Posts Exposed Wenzhou Train Crash on Sina Weibo 113
         
 
 
In the preliminary investigation about the cause of the collision, the Ministry of 
Railways claimed that it was likely caused when lightning struck the stall of the first 
train (D301), which was then hit from behind by another train (D3115). However, the 
fatal accident occurred at a time when the state had trumpeted its homegrown 
high-speed rail technology with billions of dollars invested each year. Both “D” trains 
were among the first generation of China’s bullet trains, launched in 2007, with a top 
speed of 155 mph.114
 
 Since few on Weibo believed that lightening was the chief culprit, 
massive critical comments piled up within hours and lasted for weeks.  
Thousands of netizens on Weibo denounced Wang Yongping, spokesman of the Railway 
Ministry, for his improper wording at the press conference, as well as the inadequate 
explanation. In addition, the netizens also criticized the state media for issuing false 
                                                        
113 Screenshot of Sina Weibo post, accessed August 8, 2011, http://www.weibo.com/1144332832/xg7t5AmUW, 
http://www.weibo.com/yangmi0408?from=otherprofile&wvr=3.6&loc=tagweibo .  
Note: Two passengers on D301 first released the train crash information via Sina Weibo, the SOS messages on Weibo 
was reposted more than 100,000 times.  
114 Tania Branigan, “Chinese Anger Over Alleged Cover-up of High-speed Rail Crash”, Guardian, July25, 2011, 
accessed September30, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/25/chinese-rail-crash-cover-up-claims . 
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figures on the number of victims and downplaying the reports and they strongly 
condemned the authorities for burying the wreckage on the spot only six hours after the 
collision. Many were also angry about the government’s crude rescue efforts and 
Premier Wen Jiabao’s belated appearance at the scene and his excuse that he was sick. 
Most netizens demanded that the government investigate the accident and publish their 
findings as soon as possible.  
 
The power of public opinion on microblogging rapidly formed an overwhelming 
pressure on the authorities and related institutions. In response, the government thus 
tightened their control over the public’s opinion. The Publicity Department of the CCP, 
on at least three occasions, ordered all media to tone down coverage about the accident, 
and no media was allowed to make any report or comments on their own and could only 
publish statements released by the authorities. Moreover, all websites were also required 
to control the information online, particularly negative posts on microblogging. Sina 
Weibo was reported to have deleted over 100,000 posts on the government’s 
accountability of the accident. However, they were unable to stop popular outrage 
disseminating on microblogging. Billions of Chinese netizens kept expressing their 
unhappiness on Weibo about how the authorities handled the aftermath of the accident. 
 
Outcome: Despite the widening social tension and deepening public distrust triggered 
by the collision, the government did not make a timely and efficient response to the 
public demand. According to the compensation agreement, Ministry of Railways paid 
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500,000 yuan (US$ 78,407) in compensation for each victim.115 Wang Yongping, the 
spokesman of China Railway Ministry, was reportedly sacked for his improper 
utterances during the press conference on the train crash. However, it is not known for 
sure whether his dismissal was related to the incident, as the government only 
announced that Wang would be reassigned to the Warsaw-based international railway 
cooperative organization without actually disclosing reasons for his transfer.116
 
  
In addition, after more than half a year, the long-awaited official report on the train 
collision investigation was finally released on December 28, 2011. By then, public 
attention had dwindled, and memories of the accident were a blur. To the netizens’ 
disbelief, the official report stated that there were only 40 deaths. Although 54 
government officials were said to be responsible for the accident, the primary 
responsibility was conveniently pushed to the former railway minister Liu Zhijun and 
former deputy chief engineer and transportation secretary Zhang Shuguang, who were 
both already in prison for corruption before the accident occurred.117
 
 In other words, 
the public criticism and efforts on Weibo seemed to contribute little to the transparency 
of truth-finding and final investigation, even if it exert pressure on the government; in 
retrospect, the public’s demand on the Wenzhou train accident was only partially 
fulfilled.   
                                                        
115 David Barboza, “Crash Raises Questions on China’s Push to Build High-Speed Passenger Rail Lines”, New York 
Times, July26, 2011. accessed November 4, 2011,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/world/asia/27china.html?pagewanted=all .  
116 Andrew Jacobs. “Spokesman Fired After Chinese Train Crash Has New Job”, New York Times, August 18, 2011, 
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3. Free Chen Guangcheng Movement 
 
Incident: The Free Chen-cheng Movement on Weibo intermittently lasted one year, 
from the second half of 2011 till May 2012. Netizens continuously posted and 
forwarded posts, aimed at pressuring the authorities to release Chen Guangcheng. As a 
blind activist, Chen used his self-taught knowledge of the law to help peasants in his 
village, Linyi City, in Shandong Province to defend their rights; he revealed the local 
government’s abuse of power and accused them of adopting harsh measures, such as 
forced abortions and sterilizations, to enforce the one-child policy. Repeatedly acting in 
defiance of local government warnings and coercion, he was finally arrested and 
sentenced to a four–year jail term in 2006. After his release in September 2010, he and 
his family were placed under house detention, and closely monitored.118
 
  
Chen’s case once attracted the attention of international human rights organizations; 
however, all Chinese domestic media were ordered to maintain their silence on the issue. 
The local Linyi government increased their investment in maintaining stability, and 
twenty guards were hired on government payroll to take turns watching over Chen 
every day and to prevent outsiders from coming into contact with him.  
 
It did not become the public focus until some public intellectuals, journalists and other 
key opinion leaders went on Weibo and intensively issued posts and forwarded relevant 
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information about Chen; and many netizens joined in the fray, with some even changing 
their microblogging icons to sunglass images in support of the movement and to 
pressure the authorities to free Chen and allow his six-year-old daughter to go to school. 
Some netizens even organized visits with Chen offline, and updated information on 
Weibo about their being intercepted and turned away by the local police, or being beaten 
by the guards. Surveillance was so tight that no one succeeded in visiting Chen.  
 
The discussions on Sina Weibo remained a concern and reached its climax on October 
16, 2011, when five Weibo celebrities, including a China’s famous publisher Wang 
Xiaoshan attempted to visit Chen Guangcheng. (Figure 13)  
 
Figure 13: The Trend of Key Words “Chen Guangcheng” Discussed on Sina Weibo 




They kept issuing posts and pictures about the difficulties they encountered for 
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approaching Dongshigu Village, where Chen remained under house arrest. The posts 
about Chen and their visit on Sina Weibo numbered 116,281, but most of the posts 
deleted or hidden in a short time.  
 
Outcome: No matter how the Netizens organized the movement calling for Chen 
Guangcheng to be freed, their efforts were met with harsh crackdown by the authorities 
and Chen remained detained until his dramatic escape with organized outside help in 
late April 2012. But the efforts of Weibo netizens were not in vain, as the government 
did, to some extent, compromise and fulfill requests in response to the public; for 
instance, in October 2011, Chen’s daughter was allowed to attend school, although she 
was still followed by two or three guards every day.120
 
  
Half a year later, when Chen successfully arrived in Beijing and sought the protection of 
the U.S. Embassy, the event suddenly reached a turning point as the breaking news 
immediately aroused the public excitement about Chen on microblogging sites again. At 
first, both the Chinese and U.S. governments refused to comment on the issue, until 
May 2, when microblogging rumors were verified and photo of Chen sitting in a 
wheelchair attended to by a nurse was widely circulated on Weibo, but it was soon 
deleted by the website. Similar photos published by the U.S. Embassy on its official 
Weibo account were also deleted, as all users on China’s Weibo are regarded and treated 
equally when it comes to censorship.  
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However, many Chinese netizen had already seen the photos of Chen in the company of 
Gary Locke, the U.S. ambassador to China, at the hospital. In the following days, news 
about Chen all followed a circuitous route—first reported by foreign media outside the 
“Great Fire Wall,” then transmitted to the inside “Wall”—to be known to the public via 
Weibo, as all other media were still not allowed to cover the issue. Chen Guangcheng’s 
case finally came to an end on May 19, 2012, when Chen finally landed in New York 




As for Chen’s dramatic escape, the public and media were only focused on his success, 
and few paid attention to how and why the disabled was possible to get under the radar 
despite tight surveillance, climb over seven walls and crossed one river by himself, 
when hundreds of non-disabled people could not even approach his home. 
Coincidentally, the timing of Chen’s escape was just one week before US Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton’s scheduled trip to visit Beijing on May 3, 2012; the annual 
meeting inevitably involved many thorny issues, such as the complicated South China 
Sea dispute, human rights, RMB appreciation, rare earth exports, etc. It is reasonable to 
speculate that China’s authorities might have purposely created opportunities to let 
Chen escape in exchange for alleviated U.S. pressure on other issues.  
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After all, compared with other issues, Chen’s case may be considered the easiest in 
which to compromise, and there have been precedents between China and U.S. on 
human rights diplomacy. It seemed that the public demand of the Free Chen 
Guangcheng Movement had already been decided, but the government delayed the issue 
until Hilary Clinton’s visit to China. Chen thus became a bargaining chip between both 
governments by accident. In fact, his successful departure from China should be 
regarded as the outcome of U.S. intervention rather than as a consequence of public 
demand on microblogging. Cheng Guangcheng was luckier than many other activists or 
dissidents suppressed by the authorities: his story being amplified by Weibo, his plight 
made known to the public, and the role of public opinion on Weibo pushing to support 
and rescue him.  
 
4. Independent Candidates for Local Elections 
 
Incident: In summer 2011, a wave of independent candidates on microblogging had 
lasted for months; more than one hundred candidates in different cities all over China, 
including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, etc. announced their plans to 
participate in the local congress elections on Weibo. They were from all walks of life, 
including well-known columnists, lawyers, laid-off workers, professors, farmers and 
even university students. Although all citizens over 18 years of age are entitled to run 
for the district/county level election according to China’s law, few have actually stated 
publicly that they would like to become a deputy of the grassroots people’s congress. 
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As a matter of fact, for decades since the People’s Republic of China was founded, 
almost all of the candidates chosen as the “people’s representative,” even at the 
district/county level, are hand-picked directly by the Chinese Communist Party or 
nominated by the government; the practice has become so commonplace that most 
grassroots have no idea as to the responsibility of a deputy, nor do they know when the 
local congress opens every year. It was the first time that so many ordinary citizens had 
actively participated in the local deputy elections, which is regarded as an open 
challenge to the ruling Communist Party and political regime at the basic level in China.  
 
Some independent candidates continuously published on Weibo their campaign slogans, 
posters, pictures and difficulties they met so as to win more support; however, their 
activities were inevitably obstructed and suppressed by the authorities using all 
available means. The candidates’ posts on the elections were nearly always censored by 
the websites, and their offline activities of canvassing votes and nomination processes 
were also undermined. For instance, the local governments made an all-out effort to 
monitor, track, or confine the independent candidates; some local governments even 
pressured their families and friends to force them to give up participating in the election.  
 
The independent candidates for local election campaign in China can be traced to Liu 
Ping, a 47-year-old retired female worker at a state-owned steel plant in Xinyu, Jiangxi 
Province. Before running for the elections, Liu had, on several occasions, petitioned the 
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authorities in defense of workers’ rights, but had failed. Therefore, she attempted to join 
the establishment to achieve that goal from the inside. With the assistance of Sina Weibo, 
Liu Ping's activities were widely made known to the public. Her propositions for the 
election, photos of her speaking in public offline and other information were suppressed 
by the local government.  
 
Liu’s action applauded and supported by many grassroots activists on Weibo, at the 
same time, she offended the authorities, even if she was not powerful enough to shake 
the system, the authorities still took all efforts to obstruct her both online and offline 
before and during the election. Her electoral updates on Sina Weibo were often deleted 
or hidden, and her account was once limited to be followed.122
 
 (Figure 14)   




The local government intentionally concealed the information of the time and the place 
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for voting, and continuously constrained her freedom by all means, including detaining 
her for “investigation” for hours, blocking the signal of her mobile phones, and cutting 
off the electricity power and the access to the internet of her house.124
 
 
In addition to Liu Ping, other independent candidates also met many obstacles in the 
process of preparing for the local elections. Liang Shuxin, the founder of “Micro 
Foundation”, also announced his participation in the local election on Weibo as an 
independent candidate. He actively canvassed votes in the streets himself and posted his 
campaign posters with the slogan of “To elect a neighbor as your representative” on 
Sina Weibo.  
 
As expected, the treatment he received was not different from Liu Ping’s experience, 
even if they were in different cities and came from different social background. The 
local government attempted to prevent him from taking part in the election by all means, 
such as coercing some of his supporters to give up their nomination for him. Under all 
these pressures, he inevitably failed to be shortlisted.125
 
 At last, most independent 
candidates were forced to give up under the authorities and families’ pressure before the 
local elections. Even though some candidates persevered in face of obstructions and 
pressure, they eventually all failed and no one was successfully nominated to become 
the deputy of local congress.  
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Outcome: The independent candidate campaign waged on the platform of 
microblogging in 2011 should have brought new rays of light to China’s political 
change, but nothing seems to have been changed. Although every citizen is allowed, by 
law, to participate in the political election, in reality, they were ruled out by the 
non-stated rules of the game where only officially nominated candidates could succeed 
in the election, even at the grassroots level; although these independent candidates won 
applause on Weibo, the eligible supporters were too limited to support them; their 
published posts on Weibo did not directly challenge the government, yet they were still 
regarded as unfavorable information that had to be censored.  
 
There is absolutely no fulfillment in response to the public demands in this case, 
because such activities have set on the boundary of the government led by the 
Communist Party, who are unwilling to allow any potential risks to undermine their 
political base. The result of failure and the authorities’ crackdown are evidence that the 
process of political election and all candidates are still under the government’s control, 
which heavily frustrated the determination and undermined the confidence of grassroots 
activities in their pursuit to seek for bottom-up reform, let alone the dream of full 
democratization in China.  
 
In summary, different outcomes of fulfillments can be explained by two dimensions. 
Compare with (2) Wenzhou Train Crash and (4) Independent Candidates, the 
fulfillments of the public demands in both (1) Yihuang Demolition and (3) Free Chen 
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Guangcheng cases are more likely to be achieved, one notable difference between the 
two groups is that the number of relevant people whose interests are directly at stake in 
the issues, the number of people at stake in the latter group are obviously smaller than 
the former 126, therefore we can induct that the scale of the issue affect the outcome of 
fulfillment; As for the other dimension, when we compare the group of (1) Yihuang 
Demolition and (2) Wenzhou Train Crash with the other group of (3) Free Chen 
Guangcheng and (4) Independent Candidates Campaign, the outcomes about 
fulfillments of the former are higher than the latter 127
 
, because the political sensitivity 
of their topic are comparatively lower, while the rest two are high political sensitive, 
thus the degree of political sensitivity matters in this sense; Thus, three outcomes 
(fulfillment, partial fulfillment and non-fulfillment) that presented in the four cases can 
be interpreted as the interaction of political sensitivity and the scale of the issues as 
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Combining theoretical views from the state-centered and society-centered schools, this 
thesis highlights the trilateral relationship of the government, websites and netizens. It is 
especially focused on the strategies and constraints of each party and the outcomes of 
the game, namely the resultant fulfillment of public demands. My analysis of this 
Interactive Mechanism of the Government-website-netizen demonstrates in detail how 
the three forces struggle and interplay on Weibo.  
 
Based on four case studies, all involving netizens’ launching demands and seeking 
policy redress from the government through Weibo, I argue that the outcome of the 
tri-party interaction depends on two critical variables concerning the nature of the issue. 
One variable is political sensitivity of the topics discussed on Weibo, it provides the 
sufficient condition concerning the degree of government control and websites’ 
censorship; the other is the scale of the issue, including how many participants are at 
stake or how significant the incident is, which is largely relevant to the efficiency of 
governmental response and Weibo operators’ attitudes.  
 
To further examine the complex and delicate relationship between the three forces, I 
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selected four topics hotly discussed on Weibo as case studies. As I find from these case 
studies, demands made by netizens via civic participations on Weibo tend not to be met 
by the government as long as the civic agenda contains highly politically sensitive 
contents or affects more participants at stake. Accordingly, demands are more likely to 
be fulfilled if they involve less political sensitive topics or if fewer people are involved.  
 
The outcome of the Yihuang Demolition Incident shows that Weibo plays a positive role 
in fulfilling the public’s demands, the fundamental reason for this fulfillment being that 
the incident involved just one family challenging the local government. The public 
demands in the Wenzhou Train Crash and Free Chen Guangcheng can be regarded as 
partial fulfillment, judging from the outcomes and governmental responses, because 
they were concerned either with too many participants, or touched on high political 
sensitive issues. As for the Independent Candidates for Local Elections issue, the failure 
results from both challenging the fundamental political regime and authority, and 
involving many participants nationwide.  
 
It should be noted that the scope of discussions and the information disseminated are 
nonetheless carefully censored by the authorities, although it is the netizens who 
collectively create information and pick the topics. Whether a piece of information and 
a specific topic of discussion can survive on Weibo long enough largely depends on how 
tolerant the government is. The government remains on high alert for civic agenda that 
are hotly discussed on Weibo or that contain political sensitive contents or figures, even 
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as they remain aware that it is important to keep Weibo for the public to give vent to 
their frustrations and grievances. The true challenge lies in how to balance information 
control and effective use of Weibo to legitimize the existing political regime.  
 
Moreover, the civic agenda hotly discussed on Weibo are easily influenced and 
intercepted by external forces, which might affect the variation of two explanatory 
variables: political sensitivity and the scale of the issue. Some high political sensitive 
topics on Weibo is only for some local officials or specific government departments, as 
for central government or high-ranking officials, these discussions on Weibo present no 
serious challenge to their governance and positions; Some events regarded as high 
sensitive issues at the very beginning might become less sensitive after they are 
extensively discussed by the public on Weibo, while some less sensitive issues 
disseminated on Weibo suddenly become taboos because of too much concern on 
Weibo. 
 
The authorities has been kept increasing their investments in technology, human and 
financial resources to strengthen their control over the flow of information on Weibo. 
However, these strategies inevitably lead to a distorted nation-state and bad 
governance.128
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 Online suppression does give rise to public distrust in the public sector; 
consequently, it further deepens the rift between netizens and the government. In the 
long run, the political costs are immeasurable, even if the short-term economic costs can 
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be calculated.  
 
Stuck between the government and the netizens, the internet companies, as the 
censorship executor and Weibo operators, play an increasing significant role in 
balancing the both the government and internet users. Their dilemma exists between 
survival and profits, as any business decision-making is possible to offend the both sides. 
Most of the time, they make all efforts to attract and maintain netizens, as long as 
administrative orders come, they have to enforce censorship lest running the risk of 
being shut down.  
 
As for the netizens, more and more people have begun to lend their voices and make 
specific demands on Weibo, while others remain apathetic. Of course, it is unrealistic to 
expect all netizens to express their concerns about public affairs, as their interests and 
expressions are largely determined by their age, career, education and other factors. We 
cannot pretend that the public attention is easily distracted by numerous and conflicting 
information and new topics, even if there was no censorship and control. Although the 
voice from the grassroots sometimes adds pressure and challenges to the government at 
all levels, netizens seldom focus on certain topics or demands for long.  
 
Admittedly, Weibo has gradually reshaped the communications landscape in China. It 
enables ordinary people to share their views and comments equally, and the online 
public sphere is objectively enlarged in Chinese society. It indeed creates more 
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opportunities for netizens to participate in the public discourse, while opening a new 
window for both governments at all levels and the outside world to understand Chinese 
grassroots’ opinions.  
 
 
6.2 Limitations and Suggestions 
 
It is pity that the data set in this research has not been sufficient for a more detailed 
study on civic participation based on more elaborated hypotheses.  Due to China’s vast 
territory and different public demands, the netizen participation on Weibo originated 
from the real world also appear to be various and changeful. Although the cases and 
data I use in the thesis aim to reveal highly detailed information on the interplay of the 
government, websites and netizens on Weibo, and further explore the variation in 
fulfilment of the public demands through the interaction of the three forces, they cannot 
fully cover all types of civic agenda on the internet, fortunately, these cases are able to 
fix small-N problems by applying the MSSD method. In future, large-N data set can be 
expected to contribute more on in-depth study in this area by using quantitative research 
methods as a supplement.  
 
In spite of rapid growth, it still remains to be seen that how long social media like Weibo 
will last in promoting the public to participate in civic agenda online in China, how 
possible it will help Chinese netizen to take offline actions in the real world, and how 
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significant it will generate “the butterfly effect” in changing China’s political culture. 
After all, public demands on social media are still a far cry from citizen participation in 
the real world, which is the fundamental drive for change and the advancement of 
society. The gap between online engagement and offline actions still exists, even though 
some cases previously discussed have reflected the mutual conversion to some degree. 
Therefore, it is worth exploring that how possible and significant, in the real world, 
billions of netizens located in different regions take offline actions to participate 
political or social events pushed by social media. That will definitely demand a much 
more sophisticated model and much larger scales of data collection, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
The case study in my research specially concentrates on Weibo in China, however, it is 
worth thinking that to what extent the theories and models can be applied in other 
authoritarian societies. As in Arab world during 2010-2011, the revolutions promoted by 
social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, have fundamentally changed the political 
structure in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while in other countries, the power of social 
media seems to be too limited to initiate massive movements. In terms of different 
economic development, political system and culture, the influence of social media 
varies widely, thus there is more room for further exploration and comparative study in 




6.3 Political Implications 
 
Some specific cases in this study did show that Weibo can facilitate netizens’ political 
participation as well as precipitate governmental responses, although political topics and 
sensitive topics are always intercepted or suppressed before they come to the public’s 
attention. During this interesting interaction, two significant indicators of an emerging 
civil society—freedom of expression and active government response are gradually 
visible on China’s Weibo. Therefore, many views and comments come to the public’s 
attention, and discussions and participation on Weibo will hopefully bring about 
fundamental social and political changes in China.  
 
However, we need to note that the public’s attention on Weibo is still far from real life 
demonstrations on the main streets of major cities and policy deliberations within the 
standing committees of the Politburo. Contrary to “Netizens’ Onlooking” power mixed 
with noise and lack of offline mobilization and activism, the Chinese authorities’ 
microblogging-regulatory strategies combined with offline measures seem to be more 
diverse and effective, often aided by the profit-seeking motives of China’s major 
Internet firms. After realizing the powers and limitations of the social-networking 
websites, the Chinese government has become more proactive and responsive when 
coping with public opinion on Weibo. Using Weibo as a double-edged sword, they have 
much stronger capability and willingness to make good use of technology to understand 
the public’s concerns, and sometimes make compromises to quell public outrage, given 
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that the benefits outweigh the costs plus risks.  
 
In this sense, it can be argued the Weibo, if managed well enough, could act as a 
political intermediary and shock absorber that minimizes, rather than increases, direct 
confrontations between the government and the people, rather than a shock-magnifier 
that does the contrary. When many of the young and potentially politically active 
netizens focus their attention and energy on onlooking, informational exchanges and 
even government-bashing on the virtual space, rather than taking real political actions 
on the streets, the government could well monitor and manage the emotions and 
political life of the young people in a more efficient and direct way through Weibo.  
 
Therefore, regardless of the scale of issues and the political sensitivity of the issues 
under discussion, the public discussions and other civic activities originating from 
Weibo could hardly reshape the whole political process and challenge the foundation of 
the current political regime in a short time. The combination of flexible measures at the 
top, commercially-oriented interests of the Internet companies at the middle and the 
largely apolitical and entertainment-oriented masses at the bottom means that 
microblogging, or Weibo, still has a long way to go in bringing about substantive 
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The Development of Microblogging Websites/ Weibo in China                     
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The 1st Rise1     MAY 12  Fanfou.com   
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The 2
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 Wave    AUG13 Taotao.com
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1 The 1st Rise of Weibo are mainly ini tiated by professional microblogging websites ; The 2nd Wave of Weibo are mostly operated by dominant web portals and traditional media .  
2 Follow5.com has been closed on Nov 14, 2011 
3 9911.com was  operated by Myspace China, and i t has been closed on Dec 30,2011  
4 Taotao.com is the fi rs t generation of microblogging product ini tiated by Tencent.com, but it has  been closed on Jan 26, 2010, and three months later, Tencent launched Tencent Weibo. 
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